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THE FARSIGHTED STABILITY OF GLOBAL TRADE POLICY
ARRANGEMENTS
STEFAN BERENS AND LASHA CHOCHUA
Abstract. In this paper, we study and compare the stability of trade policy
arrangements in two different regulatory scenarios, one with and one without
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), i.e. current vs. modified WTO rules.
Unlike the existing literature, our paper considers an extensive choice set of
trade constellations, containing both available PTAs, Customs Unions (CUs)
and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), as well as Multilateral Trade Agreements
(MTAs), while assuming unlimited farsightedness of the negotiating parties.
With symmetric countries and under both the current and the modified WTO
rules, the Global Free Trade (GFT) regime emerges as the unique stable out-
come. In the case of asymmetry, the results are driven by the relative size of
the countries. If the world is in the vicinity of symmetry and two out of three
countries are close to identical while relatively smaller than the other one, the
area where the GFT regime is stable increases when prohibiting PTAs. How-
ever, when two similar countries are relatively larger, the availability of PTAs
is conducive to the stability of the GFT regime. Finally, if the world is further
away from symmetry, full trade liberalization is not attainable at all and an
area where the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) regime is stable appears in the
scenario without PTAs. Thus, the direction of the effect of PTAs on trade
liberalization depends on the degree of asymmetry among countries.
Keywords: Trade Policy Arrangements, Stability, Unlimited Farsightedness
JEL Classification: F13, F55
1. Introduction
Following the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947, an
increasing number of signatory countries liberalized their trade policies primarily
via two channels: bilateral and multilateral negotiations. To the present day, there
have been eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations with the current ninth
one, the Doha Round, still ongoing. At the same time, parallel to the arrangements
observed on the multilateral level, the world has seen an ever-increasing number of
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) mainly in the wake of bilateral negotiations.
Currently, about fourty percent of all countries/territories are a member of more
than five PTAs while about a quarter participates in more than ten.1
The World Trade Organization (WTO), successor of the GATT in 1995, provides
the rule set for the trade liberalization process of a significant number of countries.2
Bielefeld Graduate School of Economics and Management (BiGSEM), Bielefeld University.
The following people supported and influenced this paper through various fruitful discussions:
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1Source: http://www.wto.org
2All members of the WTO account for 96.4 percent of world trade, 96.7 percent of world GDP,
and 90.1 percent of world population as of 2007 (Source: http://www.wto.org).
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Its Article I acts as the foundation for any multilateral trade liberalization by
formulating the so-called Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle: Any concession
granted to one member needs to be extended to all other members of the WTO.3 In
this paper, trade policy arrangements that are consistent with the MFN principle
are referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs).4 Contrary to the core
MFN principle, Article XXIV Paragraph 5 explicitly allows countries to form PTAs,
specifically Customs Unions (CUs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), that do not
need to extend the concessions granted within the arrangement to other countries.5
However, Article XXIV Paragraph 5 Subparagraph (a), (b), and (c) each require
that these are without (negative) influence on other trade relations.
The (direction of the) influence of Article XXIV Paragraph 5 on the development
of trade policy arrangements is a controversial topic and the focus of many papers.6
Likewise, the primary purpose of this paper is the analysis of the stability of different
trade policy arrangements in two scenarios, that is with PTAs (current WTO rules)
and without PTAs (modified WTO rules). In particular, it is our intent to examine
whether PTAs act as ‘building blocks’ or ‘stumbling blocks’ on the path towards
global free trade (Bhagwati (1993)).
The existing literature usually considers a limited selection of trade agreements
or assumes limited farsightedness of the negotiating countries. It certainly allows for
a cleaner description of the model and interpretation of its results, but ultimately
raises the question about whether or not these restrictions significantly influence
the analysis and to what degree these frameworks capture reality. In our opinion,
certain empirical observations favor an extensive choice set and full farsightedness.
During the past rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, many countries were
simultaneously involved in other trade liberalization processes.7 Moreover, such
trade negotiations are usually complicated processes with significant effect on the
countries’ economies and accompanied by elaborate studies about feasibility and
future developments.8 Taking these assessments into account, the contribution of
our paper is an answer to the question concerning the influence on the analysis.
First of all, our paper considers an extensive set of trade agreements, containing
PTAs, i.e., CUs and FTAs, as well as MTAs. Next, endogenizing the formation of
trade agreements, each country ranks them based on a three-country two-good gen-
eral equilibrium model of international trade.9 The stability of all trade agreements
is then examined using these rankings together with the concept of ‘consistent sets’
3Article I states that ‘any [...] favour [...] granted by any contracting party to any product
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for [...] all other contracting parties’ (GATT, 1947).
4Furthermore, we interchangeably use the terms trade policy arrangements, trade agreements,
trade constellations, and trade relations.
5Article XXIV Paragraph 5 states that ‘[...] this agreement shall not prevent [...] the formation
of a customs union or of a free-trade area [...]’ (GATT, 1947).
6The next part of this paper contains further information on the related literature.
7Maggi (2014) showcases the importance of an extensive set of trade constellations.
8Aumann and Myerson (1988) provides a (brief) description of the criticism against the use of
limited farsightedness in general: ‘When a player considers forming a link with another one, he
does not simply ask himself whether he may expect to be better off with this link than without
it, given the previously existing structure. Rather, he looks ahead and asks himself, "Suppose
we form this new link, will other players be motivated to form further new links that were not
worthwhile for them before? Where will it all lead? Is the end result good or bad for me?"’
9A model similar to that of Saggi and Yildiz (2010), which itself is a modification of the one in
Bagwell and Staiger (1997). The modified one is also used in Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013).
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as stable sets - a notion proposed by Chwe (1994). As a result, our paper expands
the set of trade agreements under consideration and also extends the farsightedness
of the negotiating parties in comparison to the literature. In fact, to the best of
our knowledge, no other paper considers a choice set as extensive as ours.
In the end, our analysis shows that the effect of PTAs on trade liberalization
depends on the size distribution of the countries. As long as the countries are close
to symmetric, Global Free Trade (GFT) emerges as the unique stable outcome
under both the existing and the hypothetical institutional arrangement. However,
when two countries are considerably smaller, a modified WTO without PTAs would
facilitate the formation of GFT. By contrast, if two countries are relatively larger,
this modified WTO would actually obstruct the development towards GFT. Once
the world is further away from symmetry, full trade liberalization is not attainable
at all and abolishing the exception for PTAs might result in the worst possible state
from the perspective of overall world welfare, the non-cooperative MFN regime.
The findings of our paper notably deviate from those of the existing literature.
Compared to the paper of Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013), the composition
of the stable set of trade policy arrangements differs on a substantial part of the
parameter space under consideration (while coinciding on the remainder). Beyond
that, the comparison with the work of Lake (2017) yields not only a difference in
terms of stability but also with respect to the driving force(s).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the
related literature, Section 3 specifies the model, Section 4 analyzes the findings
while further details are discussed in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes our paper.
2. Related Literature
An ever increasing body of literature studies the different aspects of international
trade agreements. It is not our goal to completely review this stream of literature.10
The emphasis of this part of our paper is on the methodology of the related papers.
Further details, in particular a comparison of the model predictions, can be found
in Section 5. In the following, the focus is on the so-called ‘rules-to-make-rules’
literature (Maggi (2014)) that tries to determine the role of PTAs in the global
trade liberalization process.
A number of relevant papers are the work of Saggi, Yildiz and various co-authors.
Saggi and Yildiz (2010) considers a three-country trade model where the degree
and nature of trade liberalization, bilateral and multilateral, are endogenously de-
termined. Using Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, the authors study the stability of
FTAs and MTAs while varying the extent of asymmetry among the countries with
respect to their size. In a subsequent paper Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013)
study the complementary case by focusing on the combination of CUs and MTAs
while leaving everything else fixed (in terms of their framework). By contrast, the
paper of Missions, Saggi and Yildiz (2016) analyzes the effect of both forms of PTAs,
i.e. CUs and FTAs, on attaining global free trade, but excludes MTAs. In a sense,
this completes their ‘2 out of 3’ pattern of trade agreements under consideration.
Another related paper (in terms of farsightedness) is the work of Lake (2017),
who uses a dynamic approach to understand whether FTAs facilitate or impede
the formation of GFT. The approach uses a three-country dynamic model where a
10The reader may want to consult the papers of Maggi (2014), Grossmann (2016), and Bagwell
and Staiger (2016) for a detailed review of the related literature.
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fixed protocol specifies for each period the exact nature (and order) of negotiations.
Then, on the basis of Markov Perfect Equilibria in pure strategies, the author
analyzes the effect of country asymmetries on global trade liberalization.
Furthermore, a variety of research focuses purely on analyzing the effect of FTAs.
Goyal and Joshi (2006) consider several countries with a homogeneous good in their
model and study different degrees of asymmetry across countries. They employ the
notion of Pairwise Stability by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) as the solution method.
Furusawa and Konishi (2007) use similar methods but introduce heterogeneity with
respect to goods. In a separate section, they also briefly discuss a setting with CUs,
but overall focus on FTAs. Another related paper to Goyal and Joshi (2006) is
that of Zhang et al. (2013) in which the concept of Pairwise Stability is replaced
with Pairwise Farsighted Stability by Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009),
thereby comparing myopia with farsightedness in an otherwise fixed framework.
Also connected to this is the paper of Zhang et al. (2014), which uses the work
of Goyal and Joshi (2006) as a benchmark and analyzes the evolutionary effect of
the number of countries in a dynamic framework featuring random perturbations.
Now, while all of the aforementioned papers employ (different) network-theoretic
concepts, there is also Aghion et al. (2007), which features standard cooperative
game theory. In the three-country model presented there, a single country takes on
the role of negotiation leader and decides to either engage in sequential bilateral or
single multilateral bargaining with the other countries.
The stability concept of our approach is that of Chwe (1994). It is (in parts) a
response to the criticism of the von-Neumann-Morgenstern stable set (solution)11.
The approach aims to achieve two goals, namely to include unlimited consideration
of the future by the participants while simultaneously avoiding emptiness of the
stable set that plagues other (more) restrictive solution concepts. It is also closely
related to the stability concept found in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009)
and its extension (HMV (2014)). In fact, as is noted by the authors, their criterion
constitutes a stricter version, but in specific cases (like our model) they coincide.
3. Model
3.1. Setting. Let N = {a, b, c} denote the set of all (three) countries in the world.
Furthermore, let X denote the set of all trade agreements between these countries,
see Section 3.3 for an explicit list. Then, the welfare function of each country
induces a collection of preferences on X denoted by {≺i}i∈N , see Section 3.2 for
a description of the employed trade model that determine the welfare functions.
Moreover, the non-empty subsets S of N specify the coalitions of countries, i.e. the
grand coalition, coalitions of two, and single coalitions. Naturally, the preferences
of the individual countries induce those of the coalitions, namely for x1, x2 ∈ X and
S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅: x1 ≺S x2 if and only if x1 ≺i x2 for all i ∈ S. Further, the actual
ability of coalitions to change the status quo of trade agreements is captured via
the collection {→S}S⊆N,S 6=∅ of effectiveness relations defined on X, see Section 3.5
for the resulting overal network structure. In combination, the preferences together
with the effectivenes relations will allow us to analyze the (potential) stability of
different trade agreements, see Section 3.4 for a formal definition of the employed
concept of stability. Finally, to determine the stable and unstable trade agreements
11Consult von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) for a description of this (solution) concept
and Harsanyi (1974) for its criticism.
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an algorithm numerically evaluates a grid of the parameter space, see Section 3.6
for details.
3.2. Underlying Trade Model. In order to study the stability of different con-
stellations of trade agreements, our framework utilizes a three-country trade model
with competition via exports. It will determine the welfare of each country and
thereby induce preferences and rankings over all regimes. The model itself follows
the one used by Saggi and Yildiz (2010).
Recall that N = {a, b, c} denotes the set of countries. Further, let G = {A,B,C}
denote three (corresponding) non-numeraire goods. Now, each country i is endowed
with zero units of good I (corresponding capital letter) and ei units of the others.
Ultimately, it will end up importing I and exporting J and K with J,K 6= I.
To guarantee the ‘competing exporters’-structure, a general condition needs to be
applied to the degree of asymmetry with respect to the endowments of the countries.
For i and j in N with i 6= j, in order for the exports from i to j to be non-negative
the condition 3ej ≤ 5ei needs to be satisfied. Thus, the general condition reads as
follows:
3
5
max{ej , ek} ≤ ei ≤ 5
3
min{ej , ek} ∀ i, j, k ∈ N
The preferences of individuals in each country are furthermore assumed to be
identical. The demand for any non-numeraire good L ∈ G in country i ∈ N is given
by the function d(pLi ) = α − pLi with pLi the price of good L in country i and the
(universal) reservation price α.12 Each country also (possibly) imposes tariffs on
the goods imported by them. Let tij denote the tariff imposed by country i on the
import from country j. All prices and tariffs of a specific good I ∈ G are connected
via the following no-arbitrage condition
pIi = p
I
j + tij = p
I
k + tik(1)
where i, j, k ∈ N are pairwise distinct. In this model, the resulting prices together
with the corresponding endowments are the only factors influencing imports and
exports. In particular, the level of imports mIi of good I to country i is completely
determined by the demand function (depending on the price), mIi = d(pIi ) = α−pIi .
The exports xIj of good I from country j are the combination of the demand function
(or prices) and the corresponding endowment, xIj = ej − d(pIj ) = ej + pIj −α. Now,
a market-clearing condition for any good I requires that country i’s import is equal
to the total export of the countries j and k (again i, j, k ∈ N pairwise distinct):
mIi = x
I
j + x
I
k(2)
Ultimately, the objective function of country i is its welfare13, denotedWi, which
includes Consumer Surplus (CS), Producer Surplus (PS), and Tariff Revenue (TR):
Wi =
∑
L∈G
CSLi +
∑
L∈G\{I}
PSLi + TRi
12The demand function is derived from a utility function that is additively separable and also
quadratic in each non-numeraire good.
13In certain cases (depending on the trade agreement) the objective function of a country
includes the welfare of other countries as well. See Section 3.3 for the details.
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Now, CS is composed of three parts itself, namely one for each good. The
consumer surplus CSIi with respect to the foreign good I is CSIi =
1
2 (α − pIi )mIi
and CSLi =
1
2 (α − pJi )(ei − xJi ) for a domestic good L. Also, PS splits into two.
The producer surplus PSLi for a domestic good L is given by PSLi = xLi (pLl − tli) +
(α− pLi )pLi . Finally, the tariff revenue TRi is given by TRi = xIj tij + xIktik.
3.2.1. Equilibrium. Let us start by using no-arbitrage (1) and market-clearking (2)
to compute the equlibrium prices:
pIi =
1
3
3α−∑
j 6=i
ej +
∑
j 6=i
tij

Using these equilibrium values, it is possible to calculate imports, exports, and
also the welfare of each country up to the value of the tariffs (Appendix B.1). Note,
that the maximization of welfare with respect to tariffs is going to be restricted
depending on the trade agreement under consideration, see Section 3.3. For example
in the case of MFN, country i maximizes Wi under the restriction that tij = tik.
Therefore, country i aims to maximize its welfare Wi over (tij , tik) ∈ Ti given
(tji, tjk) ∈ Tj and (tki, tkj) ∈ Tj , where Tl is the set of possible tariff pairs for
country l in a fixed trade agreement.
The full equilibrium of this model is computed as follows. Fix a trade agreement
and thereby the restrictions on the tariffs. Compute the best-response functions for
each country (with respect to the tarifs) and determine the optimal choices. While
Section 3.3 contains all information on the trade agreements that is necessary to
compute the equilibria, the actual results are presented in Appendix B.2. Finally,
an overview of the (resulting) overall welfare can be found in Appendix B.3.
3.3. Trade Policy Arrangements. All trade relations in our model are one of
four types: MFN, CU, FTA, and MTA. Each type, except for MFN, naturally in-
duces different combinations of insiders and outsiders. Namely, three combinations
of two members and one of three (each for CU, FTA, and MTA).14 Additionally,
the case of FTA contains the possibility of a special hub structure with two FTAs
at the same time - adding another three combinations. In total, our model allows
for 16 different trade constellations.15 For each of these trade agreements the tariffs
are bounded from below and above by zero and the MFN-tariff respectively, which
is discussed in more detail in Appendix B.2. The corresponding set of tariffs for
country i, i.e. [0, tMFNi ], is denoted by Ti. Any additional restrictions on tariffs,
specific to trade agreements, are listed here:
In the baseline case, i.e. MFN, countries do not liberalize their trade relations
at all, but the non-discrimination principle still applies. Each country unilaterally
14Note that in our model Global Free Trade is essentially listed in three different variations,
via CUs, FTAs, and MTAs. The actual welfare is necessarily equal across all three variations,
but not their position in the network (Section 3.5). In particular, for our concept of stability it is
important which group of countries can create or destroy specific trade agreements (Appendix C.1).
Occasionally, all three variants together are going to be referred to as ‘GFT’ (when applicable).
15The framework does not contain combinations of different classes of trade agreement due
to the possibly conflicting restrictions on tariffs that the different classes entail. In order to
circumvent potential conflicts one would need to fix an (arbitrary) ordering in terms of priority
(or importance) of trade agreements, which would reduce the explanatory power more than the
inclusion of other combinations of trade agreements would increase it (in our opinion).
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chooses its (optimal) tariffs accordingly. Therefore, the optimization problem of
country i is max(tij ,tik)∈TMFNi Wi with T
MFN
i = {(tij , tik) ∈ R2≥0 | tij = tik}. Note,
that in this reference scenario each tariff is chosen from R≥0 instead of Ti.
In case country i and j form CU(i,j), each of them removes any trade restriction
on the other country and then jointly imposes an optimal tariff on country k. Thus,
the optimization problem of country i and j is max(tij ,tik)∈TCUi ,(tji,tjk)∈TCUj Wi+Wj
with TCUi = {(tij , tik) ∈ T 2i | tij = 0} and TCUj analogous. Finally, country k simply
follows and applies the principle of MFN (as before). However, as soon as all three
countries enter a single CU together, the (common) optimization problem is trivial,
because the only possible tariff of each country towards any other country is zero,
and the scenario is denoted by CUGFT.
In case country i and j form FTA(i,j), each of them removes any trade restriction
on the other country and then unilaterally imposes an optimal tariff on country k.
Thus, the (representative) optimization problem of country i is max(tij ,tik)∈TFTAi Wi
with TFTAi = {(tij , tik) ∈ T 2i | tij = 0}(= TCUi ). The optimization problem of
country k is identical to that of the third country in case of a CU. Further, in case
country i forms an FTA both with j and k, that is FTAHub(i), then both tariffs of
country i are set to zero by nature of its trade relation with both other countries.
Each of the other two countries operates as before: Country j (k analogous) faces
max(tji,tjk)∈TFTAj Wj where T
FTA
j = {(tji, tjk) ∈ T 2i | tji = 0}. Thus, in terms of
decision problem, it does not matter for a country whether its partner also forms
another trade agreement with the other country. Finally, if all three countries in
pairs of two countries form FTAs, then the optimization problem is identical to the
case of CUGFT, denoted FTAGFT, but the actual trade agreement is different in
terms of structure and network position, see Section 3.5.
In case country i and j form MTA(i,j), then both jointly change their tariffs with
respect to each other and also for the third country (at the same time). Thus, the
optimization problem of country i and j is max(tij ,tik)∈TMTAi ,(tji,tjk)∈TMTAj Wi+Wj
with TMTAi = {(tij , tik) ∈ T 2i | tij = tik} and Tj analogous. As seen before, the
optimization problem of country k is identical to that of the third country in case
of a CU. Again, as soon as all three countries enter a single MTA together, the
optimization problem is identical to the case of CUGFT, denoted MTAGFT, but
also different in terms of network position, see Section 3.5.
3.4. Stability Concept. As concept of stability our framework makes use of the
approach of Chwe (1994).16 Consider the tuple Γ =
(
N,X, {≺i}i∈N , {→S}S⊆N,S 6=∅
)
that correspondingly describes the evolution of the status quo of trade agreements
driven by the combination of preferences and effectiveness relations:
Let x ∈ X be the status quo of trade agreements at the start. Next, each coalition
S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅ (including individuals) is able to make y ∈ X the new status quo
as long as x →S y. Continue with such y as the new status quo. If a status quo
z ∈ X is reached without any coalition moving away, then the state is actually
realized and each country receives their corresponding welfare.17 In consequence,
any coalition only favors following through on their ability to move, x→S y, when
16Consult the paper of Chwe (1994) for the proofs of the propositions that are presented here.
17Technically, the model is without any true sense of time. Any start (or end) as well as any
sequence of actions should be interpreted as a thought-experiment. Furthermore, a path created
in this fashion is generally not unique.
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prefering the final welfare over the current one, x ≺S z. Formally, this comparison
of states by (chains of) coalitions is captured in the definition of direct and indirect
dominance:
Definition 1 (Dominance). Let x1, x2 ∈ X. Then,
i) x1 is directly dominated by x2, write x1 < x2, if there exists S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
such that x1 →S x2 and x1 ≺S x2.
ii) x1 is indirectly dominated by x2, write x1  x2, if there exist sequences
y0, y1, . . . , ym ∈ X (with y0 = x1 and ym = x2) and S0, S1, . . . , Sm−1 ⊆ N ,
such that Si 6= ∅, yi →Si yi+1, and yi ≺Si ym for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1.
Note, that if x1 < x2 for some x1, x2 ∈ X, then automatically x1  x2.
Using this definition, the concept of ‘consistent set’ describes a (sub-)set that
exhibits internal stability in the form of a lack of incentive to deviate:
Definition 2 (Consistent Set). A set Y ⊆ X is consistent if y ∈ Y if and only if
for all x ∈ X and all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, with y →S x there exists z ∈ Y where x = z
or x z such that y 6≺S z.
In general, a consistent set is not necessarily unique, but the following proposition
allows us to talk about the unique ‘largest consistent set’, i.e. the (consistent) set
that contains all consistent sets:
Proposition 1. There uniquely exists a Y ⊆ X such that Y is consistent and
Y ′ ⊆ X consistent implies Y ′ ⊆ Y . The set Y is called the largest consistent set or
simply LCS.
Or put differently, it is the unique fixed point of the correspondence f : 2X → 2X
defined by
Y 7→ f(Y ) = {y ∈ X | ∀x ∈ X,∀S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅, with y →S x :
∃z ∈ Y s.t. (x = z or x z) ∧ y 6≺s z}.
Now, similar to the internal stability captured in the definition of consistent sets,
a form of external stability is captured via an incentive to gravitate towards the
consistent set:
Definition 3 (External Stability). Let Y ⊆ be the largest consistent set. Then, it
satisfies the external stability condition if for all x ∈ X \Y there exsists y ∈ Y such
that x y.
The following result characterizes one setting in which this condition is satisfied:
Proposition 2. Let X be finite and the underlying preferences irreflexive. Then,
the LCS is non-empty and satisfies the external stability property.
Finally, let us state a couple of comments on the application and interpretation
of this stability concept with respect to our model:
3.4.1. Application. First of all, applying Proposition 1 to our model is trivial, be-
cause it is stated without any (additional) requirements on the involved objects.
Furthermore, the application of Proposition 2 is straight forward as well: First,
the set of outcomes X is clearly finite in our setting as we are only considering a
finite number of different trade agreements. Second, any strict preference is auto-
matically irreflexive and our preferences are induced by strict welfare comparisons.
Thus, while the definition of the (largest) consistent set in general only guarantees
internal stability, our setting actually implies external stability as well:
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Corollary 1. In our setting, the (unique) LCS is non-empty and satisfies the
external stability property (in addition to the internal stability).
Now, the LCS is going to be the focus point of our analysis. Any trade agreement
is considered to be ‘(potentially) stable’ if it is in the LCS, ‘unstable’ otherwise. The
nomenclature is a tribute to the fact that the LCS as a stability concept is ‘weak:
not so good at picking out, but ruling out with confidence’, because ultimately it
‘does not try to say what will happen but what can possibly happen’ (Chwe (1994)).
3.5. Network Structure. The complete network structure consists of a collection
of transition matrices {AS}S⊆N,S 6=∅ induced by {→S}S⊆N,S 6=∅. Let S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅
be any coalition, then the entry (AS)xi,xj is 1 if xi →S xj and 0 otherwise. Thus,
the matrix for {a, b, c}, the full coalition, is simply given by (A{a,b,c})xi,xj = 1 for all
xi, xj ∈ X. Further, each of the transition matrices induces a directed graph with
the trade agreements as vertices and the effectiveness relations as edges. Therefore,
the corresponding directed graph of the full coalition is a complete directed graph
with loops.
It is noteworthy to point out that the relation (or transition) x →S x holds
for all trade agreements x and all coalitions S, but is ultimately irrelevant for
the analysis with respect to the stability. The reason for this is the fact that
our model contains no sense of time - essentially stalling negotiations serves no
purpose.18 Therefore, these transitions are ignored from now on or, put differently,
the framework only considers a form of equivalence classes, namely modulo loops.
Furthermore, whenever coalition S is able to destroy one trade agreement, say x1,
and subsequently create another one, say x2, then it is able to move directly, i.e.
x1 →S x2. Finally, for the remaining coalitions (of two and one country) only the
transition graphs are presented here. The corresponding transition tables can be
found in Appendix B.4.
Let us now consider the transition graph for a single country coalition i ∈ N
with j, k ∈ N \ {i}, j 6= k, denoting the other two countries. In this case, MFN is
connected to a number of other different elements, but not to the three variants of
Global Free Trade, CUGFT, FTAGFT and MTAGFT. Now, each of those forms a
separate group of connected trade agreements. Thus, the overall transition graph,
see Figure 1 (modulo loops), consists of four sub-graphs.
Finally, consider the transition graph for a coalition of two countries i, j ∈ N ,
i 6= j with k ∈ N \ {i, j} denoting the other country. In this case, MFN, CU(i,j),
FTA(i,j), and MTA(i,j) are all interconnected. Also, any element connected to one
of these is automatically connected to all of them. Thus, in the transition graph,
see Figure 2 (again, modulo loops), this group of four corresponds to a complete
directed sub-graph pictured as one ‘(super) node’ (dotted box).
18While staying in one trade constellation, the overall strategic situation remains the same.
Specifically, for each country and each coalition the welfare of each trade agreements only depends
on the parameters of the underlying trade model. Similarly, the network structure stays constant.
Additionally, the number of (potential) movements in a chain of trade agreements is unlimited.
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MFN
CU(i,j)
CU(k,i)
CU(j,k)
CUGFT
MTA(i,j)
MTA(k,i)
MTA(j,k)
MTAGFT
FTA(i,j) FTA(k,i)
FTAHub(i)
FTA(j,k)
FTAHub(j) FTAHub(k)
FTAGFT
Figure 1. The transition graph for coalition {i}, i ∈ N .
CU(i,j)
MTA(i,j)
MFN
FTA(i,j)
CU(j,k)
CU(k,i)
CUGFT
MTA(j,k)
MTA(k,i)
MTAGFT
FTA(j,k) FTA(k,i)
FTAHub(k)
FTAHub(j) FTAHub(i)
FTAGFT
Figure 2. The transition graph for coalition {i, j}, i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
3.6. Algorithm and Parameters. The (additional) explanatory power from the
introduction of an extensive set of trade agreements and unlimited farsightedness
comes at the cost of a complex computational problem. This problem is solved
numerically with the help of an algorithm - the pseudocode of which can be found in
Appendix A.19 The parameter space therefore needs to be specified and discretized:
First, recall that the endowments satisfy 35 max{ej , ek} ≤ ei ≤ 53 min{ej , ek}
for all i, j, k ∈ N in order to guarantee the ‘competiting exporters’-structure, see
Section 3.2. Now, without loss of generality, normalize one endowment to one,
19The authors are grateful to Michael Chwe for the provision of an exemplary algorithm.
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namely eb = 1. Consequentially, for i, j ∈ N \ {b}: emin := 35 ≤ 35 max{1, ej} ≤ ei
and ei ≤ 53 min{1, ej} ≤ 53 =: emax. Furthermore, the resulting parameter space,
Figure 3, can be split into six right-angled triangles, which are mirror images of one
another (in terms of relative endowments). Thus, again without loss of generality,
focus on one of them, namely the marked triangle, and then cover it with a grid
for the actual computation.20
ec
ea35 1
5
3
3
5
1
5
3
Figure 3. The parameter space of the endowments with eb = 1
Additionally, to produce plausible results, e.g positive prices, the factor α needs
to be chosen above a minimal value for each tuple of endowments, αmin(ea, eb, ec).
Above this minimal value, the results remain unchanged.21 Thus, by taking the
maximum over all these minimal values, αmaxmin = maxea,eb,ec{αmin(ea, eb, ec)},
adding an epsilon, α = αmaxmin + , and using it for all endowments makes sure
that all results are plausible and comparable at the same time.22
4. Analysis
Let us now present the resulting structure of stability among trade agreements
according to our framework. Figure 4 depicts the parameter space of endowments
under consideration for this - it is the (marked) triangle from before. The analysis
starts with the three extreme points, then turns to the connecting intervals, and
finishes with the entire interior. In each of these cases, two scenarios are examined.
The first scenario corresponds to the current WTO institutional arrangement while
the second one assumes modified WTO rules without Article XXIV Paragraph 5,
which would prevent the formation of PTAs (specifically CUs and FTAs).
20The distance is set to 0.0013360053440215 - due to 500 points per dimension of the grid.
21The factor α always enters the welfare of country i as 2αei (see Appendix B.1). Therefore,
any changes above the minimal value leave the welfare levels and therefore the rankings unaffected.
22In our computation  is simply fixed to 0.01, which yields α = 1.3988888888888888.
12 STEFAN BERENS AND LASHA CHOCHUA
P Q
R
PQ
Q
RPR
A
ec
ea1 53
1
5
3
Figure 4. Overview of the different points, intervals and areas of
interest depending on the (partially normalized) endowment tuple
The remainder of this analysis is structured as follows. First, Section 4.1 consid-
ers the symmetric case, see point P in Figure 4, where all countries are identical.
Second, Section 4.2 features the two extreme asymmetric cases, points Q and R,
with countries that are small, small, and large (Q) or small, large, and large (R).
Next, Section 4.3 discusses the three related intervals, sides PQ, QR, and PR, where
the countries are small, small, and varying (PQ), small, large, and varying (QR), or
small with two varying equally (PR). Finally, Section 4.4 describes the inner area,
area A, with three distinct countries.
4.1. Symmetric Case. First, let us consider the symmetric case, where symmetry
refers to identical endowments for all countries, i.e. ea = eb = ec = 1 = emin, and
corresponds to point P in the triangle of Figure 4. As the countries do not differ
from one another, the only thing that matters for welfare is whether a country is
an insider or an outsider in a specific trade agreement. In the following, we present
the ranking of preferences from the perspective of country a, which represents that
of all other countries as well, for fixed i, j ∈ N \ {a} with i 6= j:
CU(i, j) ≺a MFN ≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a FTAHub(i) ≺a FTA(i, j) ≺a FTA(a, i)
≺a CU(a, i) ≺a MTA(i, j) ≺a GFT ≺a FTAHub(a)
The case where two countries form a CU is the least favorable trade constellation
for the third country. Under such circumstances, the outsider faces the second-
highest tariffs (with MFN-tariffs the highest), while the insiders cancel the tariffs
among themselves. The exports of country a to the other countries, i and j, are
the lowest under CU(i,j) compared to all alternative trade agreements. The same
applies to the total imports. In other words, the ‘trade diversion’ effect is the
strongest for country a in case of CU(i,j). In general, the MFN regime favors
country a when compared to CU(i,j). The tariff revenue remains the same, while
the consumer surplus is lower and the producer surplus is higher - the increase
offsets the decrease. The MFN regime slackens the ‘trade diversion’ effect present
in the case of CU(i,j) by virtue of increased export values of country a.
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Among the group of bilateral trade agreements where the country is an insider,
the MTAs result in the lowest welfare (for this country). MTA(a,i) itself generates
a higher welfare for country a in comparison with the MFN regime on the grounds
of increased consumer and producer surplus. The FTAHub(i) constellation results
in even further gains in welfare for country a through higher export values and
producer surplus accordingly (the tariff revenue and also the consumer surplus are
lower under FTAHub(i) compared to MTA(a,i) though). However, country a does
not have an incentive to remain in this constellation. The unilateral deviation from
FTAHub(i) to FTA(i,j) comes with a decrease of consumer and producer surplus
but enough increase in tariff revenue to ultimately ensure higher welfare under the
latter constellation. Nonetheless, among FTAs being an outsider is less desirable
than being an insider for any country. The drop in tariff revenue is offset by an
expansion of the consumer and producer surplus, resulting in higher welfare for
country a in case of FTA(a,i) compared to FTA(i,j). As an insider, country a
prefers CU(a,i) over FTA(a,i) though. More precisely, in spite of the decline in the
consumer surplus, the actual welfare goes up through an expansion of tariff revenue
and producer surplus.
The formation of MTA(i,j) guarantees the highest welfare for country a compared
to any other bilateral trade agreement. The driving factor is the MFN-principle,
which implies that in case of MTA(i,j) the insiders need to apply the same tariff to
both each other and the outsider - a form of free-rider problem. At the same time,
country a attains the highest possible tariff revenue.
Each country obtains the second-highest welfare level when the world reaches
global free trade. Under full trade liberalization, the producer surplus is also the
second-highest among all trade agreements (effectively driving the ranking). It
is only surpassed by that of FTAHub(a). The latter constellation brings about
the highest possible welfare for country a. But note that such a trade agreement
disproportionally favors the hub country over the other countries.
Countries’ strong preference rankings are the crucial ingredient for computing
the LCS. In fact, for each country all three variants of global free trade are ranked
as second-best option while each first-best option, a hub structure, is ranked con-
siderably lower for the other countries. Intuitively, global free trade seems like a
stable compromise. The following proposition and its proof reinforce this:
Proposition 3. Under symmetry and with the current institutional arrangement
of the WTO, the LCS contains three elements: CUGFT, FTAGFT, and MTAGFT.
In other words, (the trinity of) global free trade is the unique stable outcome.
Proof. Based on the definition of indirect dominance and the transition graphs,
see Section 3.4 and 3.5, the preference rankings from earlier allow us to derive the
indirect dominance matrix. If the entry in the matrix is equal to one (resp. zero),
then the trade arrangement corresponding to the row of the entry is (resp. isn’t)
indirectly dominated by the one corresponding to the column of the entry. For
example, FTAHub(a) is indirectly dominated by CUGFT as there exists a (finite)
sequence of outcomes and coalitions such that all coalitions in the sequence prefer
the final outcome over the current one:
FTAHub(a)→{b,c} CU(b, c)→{a,b,c} CUGFT
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Checking for all possible sequences yields the following indirect dominance matrix:23

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1MFN 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2CU(a, b) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
3CU(b, c) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
4CU(c, a) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
5CUGFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6FTA(a, b) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
7FTA(b, c) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
8FTA(c, a) 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
9FTAHub(a) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
10FTAHub(b) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
11FTAHub(c) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
12FTAGFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13MTA(a, b) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
14MTA(b, c) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
15MTA(c, a) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
16MTAGFT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0

Note that intuitively any outcome is stable if all deviations from it are deterred.
Also, a deviation from the outcome is hindered if there is a stable outcome which
might be reached and some member of the deviating coalition does not prefer it
over the initial outcome. In the following procedure, start with the full set and
then keep removing elements that are unstable until the remaining ones are stable
Take x ∈ {MFN,FTA(i, j), CU(i, j),MTA(i, j)}, where i, j ∈ N with i 6= j,
and then consider the joint deviation x→{a,b,c} FTAGFT . The FTAGFT regime
is not indirectly dominated by any other outcome (see the matrix above) and also
x ≺{a,b,c} FTAGFT for each of those x. Thus the deviation x→{a,b,c} FTAGFT
cannot be deterred and therefore no such x can be part of the stable set.
Consider FTAHub(i), i ∈ N , and the deviation FTAHub(i)→{j,k} FTAGFT ,
j, k ∈ N \ {i} with j 6= k. Using FTAHub(i) ≺{j,k} FTAGFT together with the
logic from before eliminates FTAHub(i) for each i ∈ N .
Focus on the set of remaining elements Y = {CUGFT, FTAGFT,MTAGFT}.
Start with any element y in Y . If there is a deviation to any element x ∈ X \ Y ,
then there always exists an indirect dominance path (see indirect dominance matrix)
x y′ coming back to an element y′ ∈ Y . In addition, for any y1, y2 ∈ Y , y1 6= y2,
there does not exist a coalition S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, for which y1 ≺S y2. Thus, the set Y
satisfies the (internal) stability condition while being maximal, i.e. Y = LCS. 
In the symmetric case, under the current institutional arrangement of the WTO,
the global free trade variations appear as the only stable constellation according
to our framework. But what would happen without Article XXIV Paragraph 5?
In this case, countries would not have the option to liberalize trade through the
formation of CUs or FTAs - leaving MTAs as the only possibility. The representative
preference ranking of country a would look as follows:
MFN ≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a MTA(i, j) ≺a MTAGFT
23Appendix A contains the pseudocode for this procedure.
THE FARSIGHTED STABILITY OF GLOBAL TRADE POLICY ARRANGEMENTS 15
Each country achieves the peak welfare under MTAGFT. Thus, it is reasonable
to conjecture stability of MTAGFT. The following proposition proves this intuition:
Proposition 4. Under symmetry and with the modified institutional arrangement
of the WTO (no PTAs), the LCS contains one element: MTAGFT. In other words,
global free trade is the unique stable outcome.
Proof. The indirect dominance matrix is derived as before:

1 2 3 4 5
1MFN 0 1 1 1 1
2MTA(a, b) 0 0 1 1 1
3MTA(b, c) 0 1 0 1 1
4MTA(c, a) 0 1 1 0 1
5MTAGFT 0 0 0 0 0

Let us start with the full set of trade agreements again (limited to the setting).
If the grand coalition moves from MFN to MTAGFT , then the only possibility
is to stay there, as MTAGFT is not indirectly dominated by any other outcome.
Moreover, MFN ≺a,b,c MTAGFT . Thus, MFN cannot be stable. Furthermore,
if the grand coalition moves from any bilateral MTA regime to GFTMTA, by
the same argument, it is clear that no bilateral MTA can be stable. Finally, any
deviation from MTAGFT will come back to itself due to the indirect dominance.
Consequentially, the set Y = {MTAGFT} is consistent and also the largest one.

If symmetry among all countries holds, then Article XXIV Paragraph 5 does not
change anything in terms of stability and corresponding welfare, both individual
and overall. The only stable trade constellation is (the trinity of) global free trade.
4.2. Asymmetric Case - Vertices of the Triangle. It is natural to start the
analysis of the asymmetric case by considering its two extreme scenarios, which
correspond to the points Q and R in the triangle of Figure 4. In the following,
Section 4.2.1 discusses the case of countries that are small, small, and large (Q)
while Section 4.2.2 focuses on countries that are small, large, and large (R).
4.2.1. The case of two small and one large country. In this scenario, fix
ea = emax and eb = ec = emin (point Q). Let us start with the ranking of preferences
for country a and another country i ∈ N \ {a} - representing also j ∈ N \ {a, i}:
CU(i, j), FTA(i, j) ≺a FTAHub(i) ≺a MFN,MTA(i, j) ≺a FTA(a, i)
≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a CU(a, i) ≺a GFT, FTAHub(a)
MTA(a, i) ≺i GFT, FTAHub(a) ≺i CU(a, i) ≺i FTA(a, i) ≺i CU(a, j)
≺i MFN,MTA(i, j) ≺i FTAHub(i) ≺i FTA(a, j) ≺i MTA(a, j)
≺i FTAHub(j) ≺i CU(i, j), FTA(i, j)
One immediately notices that small and large countries have different rankings.
A large country profoundly dislikes the scenarios where it is an outsider; while the
small countries, by contrast, dislike any trade arrangements with the large country.
Note that in certain cases countries actually do not differentiate between different
16 STEFAN BERENS AND LASHA CHOCHUA
trade constellations.24 For example, CU(i,j) and FTA(i,j) result in same welfare
for all countries. In this case, under the given pattern of endowments, the optimal
tariffs of the small countries for CU and FTA are above the MFN-tariff. However,
the Sub-paragraphs of Article XXIV Article 5 rule this out and therefore the tariffs
are capped at the MFN-level. A similar argument applies to the case of FTAHub(a).
Here, the optimal tariffs of the small countries would be negative. By restricting
tariffs from below by zero implies that FTAHub(a) corresponds to GFT, or rather
a Pseudo-GFT. Finally, the MTA between the small countries actually coincides
with the MFN regime because of identical optimal tariffs for both cases.
Next, let us analyze the preferences of the large country a. As mentioned above,
being the outsider produces the least favorable constellations for a large country.
The worst scenarios are those where the small countries form a PTA. In such cases,
the export, and hence the producer surplus, is the lowest in the large country. Now,
compared to these PTAs among the small countries, both the tariff revenue and the
consumer surplus are lower under FTAHub(i), but the comparably strong growth of
the producer surpluse produces an increase in welfare. Further increases in producer
surplus are possible via the MFN regime or MTA(a,i). As soon as the large country
forms an FTA, its welfare increases due to trade relations that benefit its exports
within the constellation. MTA(a,i) leads to an even higher welfare, but there the
driving factor are the tariff revenues. Among all bilateral trade agreements, where
the large country is an insider, the optimal outcome is CU(a,i). The highest welfare
for the large country occurs when trade is fully liberalized though. In that scenario,
it is able to completely reap the trade benefits - the producer surplus peaks when
compared to the other trade agreements.
Now, let us consider the preferences of a small country i, the countries i and j
are indistinguishable from each other in this respect. Contrary to the preferences
of a large country, it is in its best interest for a small country to avoid forming any
trade arrangement with the large country. The smallest welfare of a small country
occurs in the case of MTA(a,i), as the constellation generates one of the least
desirable combinations of tariff revenue and producer surplus. Under FTAHub(a)
or GFT, the small country achieves higher welfare through an increase in producer
surplus and despite a decrease in tariff revenue and consumer surplus. CU(a,i)
and FTA(a,i) each lead to further welfare improvements for the small country. In
both cases, the driving factor is a higher consumer surplus. Next, regardless of the
lower consumer and producer surplus under CU(a,j) (compared to FTA(a,i)), its
higher tariff revenue actually results in a higher welfare. The tariff revenue stays
at its peak under MTA(i,j) or the MFN regimes as well, but with higher welfare.
Specifically, an increase in consumer surplus offsets the decrease in producer surplus.
By comparison, FTAHub(i) actually increases the producer surplus and thereby
also the total welfare. FTA(a,j) then generates its peak tariff revenue from before
and through this a higher welfare for the small country as an outsider. Under
MTA(a,j) the tariff revenue stays the same and the lower producer surplus gets
(more than) compensated by the higher consumer surplus. Compared to this,
FTAHub(j) decreases the tariff revenue but increases both the consumer and the
producer surplus enough to increase the welfare. Finally, a small country attains the
best result by forming a PTA with the other small country, either through FTA(i,j)
24Additional details on this can be found in Appendix B.2 and Appendix B.5.1.
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or CU(i,j). While keeping relatively high tariff revenues, the small countries manage
to have a high producer surplus as well.
Using the preference rankings to derive the LCS yields the following proposition:
Proposition 5. With the endowments given by ea = emax and eb = ec = emin, and
under the current institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellations
are the PTAs between the two small countries, that is CU(b,c) and FTA(b,c).
Proof. Let us start by giving the indirect dominance matrix:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1MFN 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2CU(a, b) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
3CU(b, c) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4CU(c, a) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
5CUGFT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
6FTA(a, b) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
7FTA(b, c) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8FTA(c, a) 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
9FTAHub(a) 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
10FTAHub(b) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11FTAHub(c) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12FTAGFT 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
13MTA(a, b) 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14MTA(b, c) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15MTA(c, a) 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16MTAGFT 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0

Recall that X denotes the full set and let Y = {CU(b, c), FTA(b, c)} be the
candidate for the LCS. Take any element x from the set X \ Y and consider the
deviation x→{b,c} CU(b, c). Note that CU(b, c) is not indirectly dominated by any
other element from X and furthermore x ≺{b,c} CU(b, c) for all x ∈ X \ Y . Thus,
the deviation x →{b,c} CU(b, c) can not be deterred for all x ∈ X \ Y . Therefore,
no such x can be part of the stable set.25
As each outcome in X \ Y is indirectly dominated by y ∈ Y (see the matrix),
for any coalition and any deviation away from y ∈ Y there always exists a path
of indirect dominance back to Y . Moreover, no coalition is actually better off
when coming back to Y , as x 6≺S y for all x, y ∈ Y , x 6= y, and S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
Therefore, the set Y satisfies the (internal) stability condition while being maximal,
i.e. Y = LCS. 
Even though global free trade is the most desirable regime for the large country,
the two small countries do not have any incentive to form such a constellation and
the large country can not enforce it. As a consequence, country a ends up with
the worst trade agreement (from its perspective). Thus, in this scenario the size
advantage of the large country does not translate into a favorable stable regime.
25It might appear that this proof deviates from the general approach of eliminating element
by element from the full set until the remainder forms the stable set. However, in this proof it is
purely a coincidence that in one step all elements but the stable ones can be eliminated with one
argument (or rather deviation).
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Moreover, this specific case showcases the relevance of the restrictions on PTAs
(remember that insiders are not allowed to raise tariffs on outsiders). The constraint
makes the small countries be indifferent between the two forms of PTAs.
Now we turn to the hypothetical scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5.
Here, the ranking of preferences for the countries, with country a the large one and
country b and c small (represented by i and j), are as follows:
MTA(i, j),MFN ≺a MTA(a, i) ≺a GFT
MTA(a, i) ≺i MTAGFT ≺i MFN,MTA(i, j) ≺i MTA(a, j)
As a result, the best outcome for a small country i is the MTA(i, j) regime, as
the PTAs are not available anymore. The next proposition presents the new LCS
as a consequence of these changes:
Proposition 6. With the endowments given by ea = emax and eb = ec = emin, and
under a modified institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellations
are MFN and MTA(b,c).
Proof. The indirect dominance matrix is given as follows:

1 2 3 4 5
1MFN 0 0 0 0 0
2MTA(a, b) 1 0 0 0 0
3MTA(b, c) 0 0 0 0 0
4MTA(c, a) 1 0 0 0 0
5MTAGFT 1 1 1 1 0

Start with the full set again. If we consider the deviations MTA(c, a)→c MFN
and MTA(a, b) →b MFN , then no further deviations are expected as MFN is
not indirectly dominated by any other outcome. In addition, MTA(c, a) ≺c MFN
and MTA(a, b) ≺b MFN , so MTA(c, a) and MTA(a, b) cannot be part of the
stable set. The same argument works in the case of MTAGFT and the deviation
MTAGFT →b,c MFN , asMTAGFT ≺b,c MFN . So, the global free trade regime
cannot be stable as well.
Let Y = {MFN,MTA(b, c)}. Following any deviation from the elements in Y ,
there is always an indirect dominance path coming back to Y (MFN in this case).
In addition, for any x, y ∈ Y with x 6= y there does not exist coalition S for which
x ≺S y. Thus, the set Y is consistent and the largest one as well. 
In summary, when there are two small and one large country, the GFT regime
is unstable under the current and hypothetical institutional set-up of the WTO.
At best, world trade can be partially liberalized. Additionally, the small countries
profit when they can form a PTA instead of an MTA, as the limiting MFN principle
can be avoided that way.
4.2.2. The case of one small and two large countries. In this scenario, fix
eb = emin and ea = ec = emax (point R). Let us start with the ranking of preferences
for country b and another country i ∈ N \ {b} - representing also j ∈ N \ {b, i}:
GFT ≺b CU(i, b) ≺b FTAHub(i) ≺b FTA(i, b) ≺b FTAHub(b) ≺b MTA(i, b)
≺b MFN ≺b CU(i, j) ≺b MTA(i, j) ≺b FTA(i, j)
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CU(j, b) ≺i FTA(j, b) ≺i MFN ≺i MTA(i, b),MTA(j, b) ≺i FTA(i, j)
≺i MTA(i, j) ≺i CU(i, j) ≺i FTAHub(b) ≺i FTAHub(j) ≺i GFT
≺i FTAHub(i) ≺i FTA(i, b) ≺i CU(i, b)
Under the given pattern of endowments, the preference rankings of the countries
are considerably different from the previous cases. For the small country, the MFN
regime generates higher welfare than any other trade agreement where it is part of.
As for a large country, being an outsider is on the lower end of the ranking, while
being an insider in a PTA with a small country is on the other end.
Let us take a closer look at the preference ranking of the small country. First,
GFT actually generates the lowest total welfare - driven by no tariff revenue and not
enough compensation via consumer and producer surplus. As mentioned before,
any trade arrangement involving the small country results in lower welfare compared
with other constellations (but higher welfare than GFT). The lowest among those
are the CU with any of the large countries, which through increased tariff revenue
(and despite a decrease in consumer surplus) yield higher welfare in comparison with
the GFT regime. Even though FTAHub(i) reduces those gains in tariff revenue
again, by virtue of a growing consumer surplus it still raises the total welfare.
Further improvement in the welfare of the small country is possible if the world
moves from FTAHub(i) to FTA(i,b); the sole reason is a higher consumer surplus.
Under FTAHub(b), the export volumes to the large countries are at its peak and it
generates substantially higher producer surplus. As a consequence, it results in the
small country preferring to form a hub structure (as the hub node) over an FTA with
one of the large countries. Replacing the FTA with an MTA with similar structure
is the most desirable configuration for the small country among the constellations
where it participates. Under MTA(i,b) the producer surplus is actually the smallest
compared to all other alternatives, but high tariff revenue and consumer surplus
determine its position in the ranking. The MFN regime surpasses all configurations
mentioned above. When there are two large countries, the tariff revenue becomes
an important factor in the welfare of the small country. Any further improvements
with respect to the welfare of the small country depend on the large countries
liberalizing trade among themselves - the small country essentially free-rides in
these cases (exhausting its tariff revenue to the fullest). The driving factor among
these three is the export volume. Consequentially, CU(i,j) is the worst option,
followed by MTA(i,j), and FTA(i,j) is the (overall) best outcome.
The following discusses the preferences of the two large countries. The least
favorable scenario occurs when the other large country forms a CU together with
the small country. Its position in the ranking is driven by the lowest export volumes
and producer surplus. Now, FTA(j,b) produces higher welfare compared to the
previous constellation due to growth in producer surplus (based on rising exports
to the small country) which makes up for the drop in consumer surplus. A similar
development makes the MFN regime an even better constellation (here the exports
to the large country increase). All tariffs (and thus prices) are identical under
both MTA(i,b) and MTA(j,b), as a consequence they generate the same welfare.
On the grounds of increased exports, the welfare tops that of the MFN regime.
Among the class of bilateral trade agreements between the large countries, the
ranking goes as follows: FTA(i,j) followed by MTA(i,j) only surpassed by CU(i,j).
In comparison with MTA(i,b) and MTA(j,b), the greater consumer and producer
20 STEFAN BERENS AND LASHA CHOCHUA
surplus of FTA(i,j) guarantees an increase of total welfare. An MTA between the
two large countries produces more tariff revenues and actually results in a more
desirable outcome. Moving from MTA(i,j) to CU(i,j) decreases tariff revenue and
also consumer surplus but the gain in producer surplus through increased exports
to the other large country makes more than up for this. FTAHub(b) and even
more so FTAHUb(j) further improve the welfare via growth of the tariff revenue
and consumer surplus (the case of FTAHub(b)), and increased exports to the other
large country (for FTAHUb(j)). Now, the GFT regime allows the large country to
raise the exports to the small country while retaining the same level of exports to
the other large country. As a consequence, the welfare of GFT surpasses that of the
previous mentioned constellations. However, when the large country is part of a hub
structure as the hub node itself, then its exports to the small country increase such
that the welfare exceeds that of full trade liberalization. Furthermore, the FTA
with the small country constitutes the second-best outcome for the large country
on the grounds of high tariff revenue accompanied by similar consumer surplus.
Finally, CU(i,b) is the most desirable constellation driven by the high exports to
the small country.
Let us compute the LCS under these preference rankings in the next proposition:
Proposition 7. With the endowments given by eb = emin and ea = ec = emax, and
under the current institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellation is
the CU between the two large countries, that is CU(c,a).
Proof. The indirect dominance matrix is given as follows:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1MFN 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
2CU(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
3CU(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
4CU(c, a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5CUGFT 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6FTA(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
7FTA(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
8FTA(c, a) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
9FTAHub(a) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
10FTAHub(b) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
11FTAHub(c) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
12FTAGFT 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
13MTA(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
14MTA(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
15MTA(c, a) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
16MTAGFT 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0

First, take x ∈ {CU(i, b), FTA(i, b),MTA(i, b), FTAHub(i), FTAHub(b)}, with
i ∈ {a, c}. Country b can destroy such trade agreements and, depending on the
initial constellation, either FTA(c, a) or the MFN regime remains. Then, further
deviations are possible, namely MTA(c, a) and CU(c, a). However, each of the
aforementioned trade agreements is indirectly dominated by CU(c, a) and simul-
taneously country b is better off compared to the initial situation. Consequently,
such deviations can not be avoided and no such x can be part of the stable set.
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Now, consider x ∈ {MFN,FTA(c, a),MTA(c, a)} for which x →{a,c} CU(a, c)
presents a deviation that can not be deterred. As in the previous paragraph,
CU(c, a) is not indirectly dominated any element and also x ≺{a,c} CU(a, c). Thus,
no such x can be the part of the stable set as well.
At last, let x ∈ {CUGFT, FTAGFT,MTAGFT} and consider the deviations
where country b leaves the agreements. CU(c, a), FTA(c, a), or MTA(c, a) can
be the result. We have shown that the last two outcomes can not be stable. As
for CU(a, c), we have that for all x considered x ≺{b} CU(a, c). As a result, we
conclude that no such x can be in the consistent set.
CU(a, c) indirectly dominates each outcome, all deviations from it are deterred.
So, the set containing CU(a, c) is consistent and the largest one as well. 
The small country manages to block many desirable outcomes for large countries.
Country b can unilaterally deviate from any trade agreement with higher welfare
than CU(i,j) for the large countries. Thus, the majority of countries cannot impose
their will on the other country. What the large countries can achieve is the best
trade agreement that they can reach without the participation of the small country,
in this case one among themselves.
A similar story unfolds in the scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5. There,
the countries’ preference rankings are as follows, with country b the small one and
country a and c large (represented by i and j):
MTAGFT ≺b MTA(i, b) ≺b MFN ≺b MTA(i, j)
MFN ≺i MTA(i, b),MTA(j, b) ≺i MTA(i, j) ≺i MTAGFT
As the logic of the corresponding preference rankings of the countries is similar
to before, let us directly present the proposition:
Proposition 8. With the endowments given by eb = emin and ea = ec = emax, and
under a modified institutional arrangement of the WTO, the stable constellation is
the MTA between the two large countries, that is MTA(c,a).
Proof. In this case, the indirect dominance matrix has the following form:

1 2 3 4 5
1MFN 0 0 0 1 0
2MTA(a, b) 1 0 0 1 0
3MTA(b, c) 1 0 0 1 0
4MTA(c, a) 0 0 0 0 0
5MTAGFT 0 0 0 1 0

Assume, x ∈ {MTA(a, b),MTA(b, c),MTAGFT} and consider the deviations,
where country b dismantles any above mentioned constellation. Two possibilities:
Either MFN or MTA(c, a) remain. From MFN either no coalition moves away
or, as it is indirectly dominated byMTA(c, a) (see the indirect dominance matrix),
the latter might be approached. In either case, b is better off. Thus, no such x can
be part of the stable set.
Now, analyze the case of the MFN regime. Take the following deviation:
MFN →{a,c} MTA(c, a). As MTA(c, a) is not indirectly dominated by any other
trade agreement and MFN ≺{a,c} MTA(c, a), the MFN regime can not be stable
as well.
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As MTA(c, a) indirectly dominates each trade agreement, all deviations from it
are deterred. So, the set consisting of MTA(c, a) is consistent and the largest one
as well. 
Thus, similar to the other asymmetric case, one small and two large countries
allow for partial but not full liberalization of world trade irrespective of the actual
scenario (current vs. modified WTO rules). In terms of overall welfare, the world is
better off in the hypothetical scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5 though.
Individually, the small country is in a better position in case of MTA(i,j) compared
to CU(i,j), as it exploits the MFN obligation of the large countries. By contrast,
the large countries are better off in the other case. Therefore, while none of the two
institutional arrangement facilitate global free trade, they influence the welfare for
the stable set (both overall and individual).
4.3. Asymmetric Case - Edges of the Triangle. Let us now turn to the cases
where the endowments of countries vary along one dimension - corresponding to the
sides PQ, QR, and PR in the triangle of Figure 4. Specifically, Section 4.3.1 presents
the scenario where the countries are small, small, and varying (PQ), Section 4.3.2
discusses the setting where the countries are small, large, and varying (QR), and
Section 4.3.3 describes the case of a small country with two varying equally (PR).
While in the previous cases it was still possible to solve the problems analytically,
the following require the use of a numerical approach. The analysis presented here
consists of graphics picturing the composition of the stable sets and accompanying
descriptions that explore the underlying mechanics. The exact numerical values for
these (sub-)intervals can be found in Section C.2.
4.3.1. The case of one small, one large, and one varying country. First,
let us consider the case eb = emin, ea = emax, and ec ∈ (emin, emax) (side QR).
Under the given pattern of the endowments, a number of trade agreements can be
completely ruled out (with respect to the LCS). The MFN and GFT regimes for
example are never part of the stable set. Additionally, none of the PTAs between
the small and the large country appear as a stable outcome. The same holds for
the hub structures where either the small or the large country is the hub node. As
for the actual composition of the LCS, see Figure 5 for a graphical representation.
The general observation is that when the varying country is close in size to the
small country, then the PTAs between these smaller countries appear as elements
in the stable set. When the country becomes larger the trade constellation between
the larger countries replaces these. Additionally, there are two small, separated,
regions in the middle of the interval where FTAHub(c) is stable.
In order to get an intuitive understanding of the results, let us identify specific
trade agreements that go from stable to unstable (or the other way around) for
certain endowment tuples. Then, explore the underlying mechanics to understand
why the changes happen.
Start with the PTAs between country b and c, the small and the varying one.
Interestingly, the only factor driving their stability are the preferences of country b
(with fixed minimal endowments). Once the MFN regime becomes more desirable
than CU(b,c) for country b, the constellation CU(b,c) drops from the stable set.
Now, an identical story holds for the case of FTA(b,c). Thus, for both constellations
it only requires a single change in the preference ranking of country b to influence
the stable set.
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Figure 5. Characterization of the case of small, varying, and large
country
The PTAs and MTAs between country a and c start to appear in the LCS when
country c is becoming relatively large and closer to country a in size. At first both
countries actually prefer to form a CU with country b, that is when country c is
relatively small (and CU(b,c) actually is an element in the stable set). However,
once it is preferable for country b to be the outsider instead of the insider in a CU,
CU(c,a) emerges as a stable outcome (even though CU(b,c) still remains stable).
Moreover, as soon as country c prefers FTA(c,a) respectively MTA(c,a) over the
MFN regime, each of them becomes part of the LCS as well. For the interval where
all PTAs and MTAs between country a and c are stable, both countries have fixed
preference relations over these outcomes:
FTA(c, a) ≺a CU(c, a) ≺a MTA(c, a)
MTA(c, a) ≺c FTA(c, a) ≺c CU(c, a)
However, as soon as country c also prefers MTA(c,a) over FTA(c,a), the joint FTA
drops out of the LCS. Similarly, as soon as country a prefers CU(c,a) over MTA(c,a),
this also applies to the joint MTA - leaving CU(c,a) as the only stable outcome.
FTAHub(c) is stable in the two small, separated, regions in (or near) the middle
of the interval. In the first region, the stability is driven by the fact that country b
starts to value FTAHub(c) more than FTA(b,c) and gets in unison with country a
in this respect. Once the preferences of country b over these outcomes get reversed,
FTAHub(c) drops out of LCS again. In the second region, the stability of the same
hub structure is largely determined by the change in the preferences of country c.
Now, as soon as it starts to value FTA(c,a) over the MFN regime, which also puts
FTA(c,a) in the LCS, both FTAs with c as a partner are stable and consequentially
the corresponding hub structure is stable as well. As soon as the free-riding incen-
tives of country b increase (valuing the MFN regime more than FTAHub(c)), this
hub structure is not part of the stable set anymore.
The hypothetical institutional arrangement without Article XXIV Paragraph 5
does not promote the appearance of GFT as part of the stable set. GFTMTA, but
also MTA(a,b) and MTA(b,c) never emerge as stable outcomes. Varying the size
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of country c generates either the MFN regime or MTA(c,a) as the stable element.
Figure 6 presents these findings.26
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Figure 6. Characterization of the case of small, varying, and large
country
Over the whole interval, country b does not have any incentive to form an MTA
with any of the other countries. This is one reason why the MFN regime is stable
over the specific range of the interval. The other reason is that country c prefers to
not have a trade agreement with country a as long as its own size is not too large.
Once country c gets sufficiently large though, MTA(c,a) presents a better option
than the MFN regime. As a consequence, MTA(c,a) replaces the MFN regime as
the stable set.
As a sidenote, while in the first scenario (with PTAs), the LCS near and at each
respective extreme point corresponded to each other (continuity), the situation is
different in the second scenario (without PTAs). When country c and b are equal
in size, MTA(b,c) appears in the LCS even though it is not there before. Here,
both the MFN regime and MTA(b,c) generate the same welfares for all countries
(see also the discussion on point Q in Section 4.2.1).
Finally, under this given pattern of endowments, the GFT regime does not appear
as part of the stable set independent of the scenario (with and without PTAs).
However, the choice of rules does determine whether partial trade liberalization
takes place or not. The possibility of forming PTAs reduces the incentive of the
small(est) country to free ride. Otherwise, the MFN regime is the unique stable
outcome when there is one small, one large, and one comparably small country.
4.3.2. The case of two small, and one varying country. Second, let us show-
case the scenario with eb = ec = emin and ea ∈ (emin, emax) (side PQ). In contrast
to the previous case, it is not possible to rule out many of the trade agreements.
Only MFN, FTAHub(a), and MTA(b,c) never appear in the LCS. The stable set is
then presented in Figure 7.27
In the immediate vicinity around symmetry, the GFT regime is the only element
of the LCS (or rather the group of the three variants forms the stable set), but both
FTAHub(b) and FTAHub(c) emerge as stable outcomes when moving away from
the extreme point. On the whole interval a number of different PTAs and MTAs,
26In addition to the aforementioned elements, it also pictures MTA(b,c) as a single point, see
the dot, but this appears only for completion sake because that point corresponds to one of the
extreme cases (point Q) discussed earlier.
27The dot marks a single point again.
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Figure 7. Characterization of the case of small, small, and vary-
ing country
mostly between a small and the larger country, appear. Near the other point, only
PTAs among the small countries are still stable.
First, the spike in the number of stable constellations close to symmetry actually
follows a change in the preferences of the varying country with respect to CU(b,c)
and the GFT regimes - it starts preferring the first over the latter. Furthermore,
FTA(a,b) and FTA(c,a) become unstable because the small countries start to like
the MFN regime more than the GFT variants (or rather these are only stable
for that instance where it is not the case). When country a gets sufficiently large,
country b prefers FTAHub(c) over CU(a,b) and c prefers FTAHub(b) over CU(c,a).
As a consequence, both of these CUs drop out from the LCS. Similarly, when
country b and c start preferring FTAHub(c) and FTAHub(b) over GFT, the latter
stops being stable. A similar argument also applies to the MTAs. When the size
of country a increases even more, both country b and c favor CU(b,c) over their
respective hub structure, which results in FTA(b,c), FTAHub(b), and FTAHub(c)
becoming unstable. When the endowment of country a gets close to maximum, the
small countries are constrained by the MFN-tariffs and do not differentiate between
CU(b,c) and FTA(b,c) anymore, which makes FTA(b,c) stable again.
In the scenario without Article XXIV Paragraph 5, the interval of GFT increases
significantly. Moreover, over two-thirds of this interval the GFT regime is the
unique element in the LCS. Additionally, all possible combinations of MTA appear
at some point (mostly close to symmetry). Figure 8 demonstrates the results.28
Around symmetry, GFTMTA is the only element in the stable set. As soon as
the small countries start to prefer MTAs with country a over GFTMTA, all three
MTAs appear in the LCS. When the size of country a increases, the MTAs drop
out from the LCS, because the small countries rank the one with the large country
as the worst trade agreements (switching last place with the MFN regime), which
actually also influences the stability of the MTA among themselves. Furthermore,
28As before, in addition to the mentioned trade agreements, the graphic also contains MFN
as a single point, see the dot, at an extreme point (again point Q).
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Figure 8. Characterization of the case of small, small, and vary-
ing country
the GFT regime becomes unstable when the small countries start to prefer their
joint MTA over GFTMTA.
Similar to the previous case, the LCS changes at one extreme point. Namely,
when the endowment of country a reaches the maximum, the MFN regime appears
in the LCS, as MFN and MTA(b,c) generate identical welfare for all countries
(again, see also the discussion on point Q in Section 4.2.1).
Under this pattern of endowments, the first scenario does not allow for a sharp
prediction via the LCS (unlike the previous case). Especially around symmetry,
where almost all trade agreements are part of the stable set. In the second scenario,
the effect of the PTAs on the stability of the GFT regime is significant though
- essentially the abolishment of Article XXIV Paragraph 5 would facilitate the
formation of GFT as long as there are two small countries and the third country is
not substantially larger.
4.3.3. The case of one small, and two varying countries. Finally, let us turn
to the case where eb = emin and ea = ec ∈ (emin, emax) (side PR). In this scenario,
depending on the size of the larger countries, any trade agreement can be part of
the stable set. The exact composition of the LCS is the basis for Figure 9.
In the interval around symmetry, the GFT variants are stable and stay the
unique elements of the stable set for longer (compared to the previous case). Also,
a collection of different trade agreements is stable relatively close to symmetry.
However, near the other extreme point, the CUs between the varying countries is
the unique stable outcome. Also, MFN is stable in two small, separated, regions.
Again, the peak in stability near symmetry comes from a shift in the preferences
of the varying countries with respect to CUs. At that point, both of these start to
prefer a CU with the small country over the different forms of GFT. The occurance
of the MFN regime actually follows a preference of the small country of MFN over
GFT (the first region) and then FTAHub(a) and FTAHub(c) (the second region).
As countries a and c are getting bigger, first MTA(a,b) and MTA(b,c) drop out
from the LCS when they rank the lowest according to the preferences of country b.
The three variants of GFT become unstable once the small country prefers CU(c,a).
Next, CU(a,b) and CU(b,c) follow as the small country starts to prefer to be in
the MFN regime over a CU with any of the larger countries. As soon as CU(c,a)
becomes the more desirable trade agreement for country b when comparing it to
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Figure 9. Characterization of the case of small, varying, and
varying country
any FTA where b participates or any hub structure with a large country as hub, all
aforementioned constellations drop out from the LCS.
Contrary to the previous case, switching off Article XXIV Paragraph 5, actually
decreases the interval where the GFT regime is part of the stable set. However,
this effect is considerably smaller. A similar observation holds for the range where
the GFT regime is the unique stable outcome. The exact composition can be seen
in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Characterization of the case of small, varying, and
varying country
The main driving force behind the stability are alterations in the preferences of
the small country over the interval. More precisely, it is important where exactly
the small country places the MFN regime in its ranking of preferences compared
to the other trade agreements. As soon as country b prefers MFN over another
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constellation, the latter drops out from the LCS. After a certain point, the MTA
between the large countries remains the only stable outcome.
Similar to the previous pattern of endowments, this case makes a clear analysis
in the first scenario difficult, especially around symmetry where, as before, almost
all constellations are stable. The effect of Article XXIV Paragraph 5 actually works
in the other direction on the stability of the GFT regime when compared to the
previous case though.
4.4. Asymmetric Case - Interior of the Triangle. In the following (and final)
part of the analysis, the focus lies on the interior of the triangle of Figure 4. Here,
unlike in the previous discussions, both CU and FTA appear together under the
label of PTA. However, a variation of the graphics of this analysis that actually
distinguishes between the two can be found in Appendix C.1. For the purpose of a
general overview, this level of abstraction suffices though - in fact, the members of
a specific trade agreement are suppressed for clarity as well, i.e. who is insider and
outsider.
First, we consider the existing institutional set-up, where PTAs are available to
the countries. Figure 11 shows the (simplified) stable sets. In a small region close
to symmetry, region one, the trinity of GFT regimes is the unique stable element.
In both a neighboring and another distant area, region two, PTAs become stable as
well. The connecting area, region three, adds MTAs as another stable element. In
a tiny area near the diagonal, region four, no form of trade agreement can actually
be excluded from the stable set. Further along the diagonal and in the asymmetric
corners, region five, PTAs are the only stable trade constellation. In between,
region six, MTAs are also stable. In another tiny area, also close to the diagonal,
region seven, MFN enters the stable set as well. In general, with a certain degree of
asymmetry among countries at most partial trade liberalization can be expected.
Next, we consider a modified institutional set-up, where PTAs are not available.
Figure 12 depicts the corresponding stable sets. In an area near symmetry as well
as in a sizeable area away from it, region one, GFT is again the unique stable
element. Connected to these are two areas, region two, where MTAs become stable
as well. Moving towards the asymmetric corners, region three, yields MTAs as the
only stable element. In between, region four, only MFN remains in the stable set.
The comparison of the graphics allows us to deduce two compelling statements.
The first noteworthy result is the extent of MFN in each scenario. In the modified
institutional arrangement without PTAs the area where MFN is (uniquely) stable
increases substantially (note that this effect is present away from symmetry). Under
(significant) asymmetry, it seems that PTAs allow countries to move towards their
international efficiency frontier (cf. Bagwell et al. (2016)).
The second interesting result is the difference in the extent of stability of GFT
in the two regulatory scenarios. First, recall that once the degree of asymmetry
surpasses a certain threshold, none of the GFT regimes remains in the stable set,
independent of the institutional set-up. Around symmetry the opposite holds in
that the GFT regimes are always stable there (in both scenarios). In between, the
effect of PTAs on the stability of GFT depends on the structure of asymmetry. See
Figure 13 for the different areas of stability depending on the regulatory scenario.
Note that region one corresponds to the aforementioned stability around symmetry.
In the case of two relatively larger countries (but not too large), the abolishment
of PTAs results in a reduction of the area where GFT is stable, see region two.
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Figure 12. Simplified Overall Stability without PTAs
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In this instance, PTAs act as ‘building blocks’ on the road to GFT. But when
two countries are relatively smaller (but not too small), the same regulatory action
yields the exact opposite effect, see region three. Here, PTAs are ‘stumbling blocks’.
Thus, whether PTAs are ‘building blocks’ or ‘stumbling blocks’ in the vicinity of
symmetry depends on the relative size of the majority of the countries.
I II
1 x x
2 x
3 x
Figure 13. The different areas of stability of the GFT regime in
the scenario with (I) and without (II) PTAs
In a nutshell: If the world is in the vicinity of symmetry and two out of three
countries are close to identical while relatively smaller than the other one, the area
where the GFT regime is stable increases when prohibiting PTAs. However, when
two similar countries are relatively larger, the availability of PTAs is conducive to
the stability of the GFT regime. Finally, if the world is further away from symmetry,
full trade liberalization is not attainable at all and an area where the MFN regime
is stable appears in the scenario without PTAs.
5. Discussion
In this section, let us first compare the findings of our paper with those of several
similar studies and underline the differences in the modeling strategies, especially
with respect to the explanatory power of each approach. Second, this section links
our predictions to different empirical observations, thereby validating our approach.
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Let us start with the paper of Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013).29 First note
that the underlying trade model in our paper is similar to theirs, which allows a
direct comparison of the findings in certain scenarios (found in the next paragraph).
The first distinction is the set of trade agreements under consideration. While in
our model countries can be involved in multilateral trade liberalization via MTAs or
they may choose to carry out their favored form of preferential trade liberalization
through CUs or FTAs, Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013) focuses on two out of
these three possibilities, namely CUs and MTAs. In our opinion, the expanded set
of trade arrangements in our model allows us to fully capture the trade-offs among
the alternatives and make the model realistic. The second significant difference is
the concept of stability. While our framework uses the notion of LCS, the paper
of Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013) utilizes Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria. As
Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) note, their notion of self-enforceability, which
is critical for Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, is too restrictive in one crucial aspect,
mainly: ‘When a deviation occurs, only members of the deviating coalition may
contemplate deviations from the deviation. This rules out the possibility that some
member of the deviating coalition might form a pact to deviate further with someone
not included in this coalition.’ Importantly, this limitation does not affect the
concept of LCS. It is not a pure academic difference. The historic development
of the two (disjoint) trade constellations in Europe in the 1960s, the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
can not be captured by a model using Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria, because it
excludes those strategies that the UK actually followed during that time.30 While
being a member of EFTA the UK applied for EEC membership in 1961 and thereby
undermined the stability of the EFTA. Furthermore, ‘the more ambitious Kennedy
Round between 1964 and 1967 coincided with negotiations to expand the EEC to
include Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, and Norway - and was motivated in
part by US concerns about being excluded from an ever-broader and more unified
European market.‘ (World Trade Report 2011). Thus, unlike the Coalition-Proof
Nash Equilibrium, the LCS allows interactions among members and non-members
of coalitions simultaneously, thereby accommodating these historic developments.
Additionally, the (conjectured) motivation of the US reinforces the importance of
the interaction among different modes and forms of trade liberalization.
In specific cases it is actually possible to directly compare the composition of the
stable sets of our paper with those of Saggi, Woodland and Yildiz (2013). In fact,
their ‘multilateralism game’ fits our scenario of a modified institutional arrangement
without PTAs. Compare Figures 2 and 5 of Saggi, Woodland, and Yildiz (2013)
with Figures 10 and 8 in our paper correspondingly. In the case with one small
country and the other two varying, both approaches predict the same stable sets
near the endpoints of the interval. In our paper GFT stays part of the stable set
even when MTAs, either between the large countries or a small and a large country,
become stable as well - which is in contrast to Saggi, Woodland, and Yildiz (2013).
A similar observation follows for the case of two small and one varying country, i.e.
29As mentioned in Section 2, this paper analyzes the case of CUs and MTA while their other
papers (Saggi and Yildiz (2010) resp. Missions, Saggi and Yildiz (2016)) focus on different combi-
nations of trade agreements (FTAs and MTAs resp. CUs and FTAs) but use a similar framework.
As a consequence, the comparison of methodology applies to these papers as well.
30See Baldwin and Gylfason (1995).
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near the endpoints of the interval results coincide while the appearance of MTAs
does not prevent GFT from staying in the stable set. Furthermore, in our model
there exists an interval where GFT becomes the unique stable element once more.
It seems that one effect of the unlimited farsightedness is the proliferation of GFT.
Another relevant paper is that of Lake (2017). Apart from the stability concept,
the approach of Lake also differs with respect to the choice set. There, the focus lies
on FTAs. In this respect, a direct comparison of the findings is difficult. Moreover,
compared to the previous paper, the ‘multilateralism game’ is further simplified in
Lake (2017), as the only possible regime there is the three country constellation that
results in GFT. Furthermore, as the underlying trade model, the paper employs
the political economy oligopolistic model. However, according to the paper, the
findings are robust with respect to various underlying trade models, including the
competition via exports model. Additionally, Lake himself compares his results to
those of Saggi and Yildiz (2010). Due to the similarity of the ‘multilateralism game’
in Saggi and Yildiz (2010) and Saggi, Woodland, and Yildiz (2013), it is only logical
to compare our results with those of Lake (2017) as with the previous paper.
According to Lake (2017), specifically Figure 3, the exact role of FTAs under
asymmetry depends on the nature of asymmetry (similar to our findings). However,
the direction of the effect of PTAs on trade liberalization is the opposite. There, in
case of two larger and one small country, FTAs act as ‘(strong) stumbling blocs’, and
with two smaller and one larger country, as ‘(strong) building blocs’. Furthermore,
there it seems that the determining factor are the preferences of the larger countries,
while in our case the findings are driven by the preferences of the smaller countries.
Thus, the aforementioned differences in the choice set and stability concept appear
to shift the power to influence the negotiations among the countries, which then
produces a different outcome. Specifically, in the case of the ‘multilateralism game’,
which corresponds to our scenario without PTA, there are essentially two areas, that
is one where GFT emerges as unique equilibrium and one with MFN instead. In the
parameter space triangle the first makes up the upper left part of the triangle, while
the second makes up the opposing lower right.31 Therefore, for two larger countries
the GFT regime remains the unique equilibrium for the whole interval, whereas in
our model it only stays stable in the vicinity of symmetry (only partially unique)
and then the MTA between the larger countries is the unique stable outcome, as
seen in Figure 10. Furthermore, for two smaller countries first GFT then MFN
is the unique equilibrium, while in the beginning GFT is also stable in our case
(although only partially unique) the MTA between the small countries takes it
place as the unique stable element near the end, depicted in Figure 8. Finally, in
the case of three different countries, it starts with MFN and ends with GFT as the
unique equilibrium, which corresponds to our findings for the first part but then
in the second part the MTA between the medium and large country is the unique
stable element, visible in Figure 6.
Another aspect of Lake (2017) necessitates a remark, namely the assumption that
a once created trade agreement remains binding from then on. Lake argues that
‘the binding nature of trade agreements is pervasive in the literature and realistic’.
However, the latest developments in the world cast doubt on this plausibility. The
USA, for example, pulled out of the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
31The first corresponds to the regions denoted WBB and SSB in Figure 3 of Lake (2017), while
the second matches the regions SBB and WSB.
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at the final stage and currently negotiates with South Korea to amend the so-
called KORUS FTA. The developments around ‘Brexit’ are another argument for
modeling non-binding trade agreements. Using the LCS as stability concept allowed
us to accommodate such deviations.
A final remark on the relation of our research with empirical observations. As
the analysis has shown, a growing degree of asymmetry among countries produced
a significant area of stability for the MFN regime when PTAs are prohibited, see
region four in Figure 12. If one would interpret the expansion of the WTO rule set
to an increasing number of countries as an amplification of asymmetry among its
member states, then the potential of PTAs to prevent the MFN regime might be
one of the driving factors of the prevalence of PTAs in recent history. However, the
World Trade Report (2011) casts doubt on this motive. According to the report:
‘Approximately 66 per cent of tariff lines with MFN rates above 15 percentage
points have not been reduced in PTAs.’ Note that a reduction of the tariff peaks
for 34 percent of the tariff lines is still a significant effect considering the fact that
the majority of tariff peaks occurs in agricultural and labor-intensive manufacturing
sectors, which are politically sensitive and countries usually try to exclude them
from the trade liberalization via PTAs. Furthermore, according to the same report,
over time more and more PTAs have included provisions regarding technical barriers
to trade - a category of the Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs). The paper of Kee, Nicita,
and Olarreaga (2009) estimates that restrictiveness measures that include NTBs
are on average about 87 percent higher than the measures based on tariffs alone.
Thus, in order to evaluate the aforementioned motive properly, the effects of NTBs
should be included in the analysis as well. Moreover, contrary to the conclusion
of the report that ‘preference margins are small and market access is unlikely in
many cases to be an important reason for creating new PTAs’, Keck and Lendle
(2012) show that the preferential utilization rates are often high even in the case
of small preference margins and they increase both with the preference margin and
the export volume. All in all, it is our opinion that there is (partial) evidence for
the motive of avoidance of MFN via PTAs which coincides with the predictions of
our model about the trade-off between trade liberalization and the MFN regime in
the asymmetric part of the parameter space.
As this overview showed, a number of core attributes of the LCS, specifically
the farsightedness, the non-binding nature of agreements, and the possibility of
interactions between members and non-members of coalitions, capture important
mechanisms present in the world and influence the composition of the stable set
significantly (when compared to other stability concepts).
6. Conclusion
Under the rules of the WTO (previously GATT), a group of countries can engage
in both multilateral and preferential trade liberalization. The formation of global
trade agreements is a complex game and the rules of the game influence the nature
of the exact outcomes. WTO’s Article I aims at creating the global free trade
system, while Article XXIV Paragraph 5 allows countries to seemingly circumvent
the liberalization process. In this paper, our focus lies on the stability of trade policy
arrangements under two different regulatory scenarios (with and without PTAs)
assuming unlimited farsightedness of the participants in the trade negotiations and
considering an extensive set of trade agreements - moving our model closer to reality.
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Unfortunately, the answer to the question whether PTAs are ‘building blocks’ or
‘stumbling blocks’ on the path towards global free trade is not as straightforward
as one would like it to be. In the end, the results presented here are mixed and
depend on the size distribution of the countries. Under symmetry, GFT is the
unique stable trade constellation in both regulatory scenarios. But as soon as one
moves away from symmetry, GFT might not be reached at all. In between, the effect
of switching off Article XXIV Paragraph 5 depends on the exact asymmetry. In case
two countries are relatively smaller, prohibiting PTAs increases the area of stability
of the GFT regimes. When two countries are relatively larger, it reduces the area.
Once the world is further away from symmetry, abolishing the exception for PTAs
might result in the worst possible state from the perspective of overall world welfare,
the non-cooperative MFN regime. Therefore, under such circumstances, PTAs act
as a mechanism that prevents the MFN regime.
Our research also raises a couple of questions in need of further investigation.
First, it would be interesting to study the robustness of the findings with respect to
the underlying trade model. While the model of competition via exports remains
popular in the related literature, economists also extensively use both oligopoly
and competition via imports model. Fortunately, the framework presented here
does allow for a different underlying trade model such as the ones mentioned above.
Another potential area of inquiry might be an extension of the framework to increase
the number of countries. Nowadays, in addition to bilateral negotiations, so-called
plurilateral negotiations play an important role in the development of preferential
trade liberalization. Recent examples are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) and
the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Including more than
three countries in a model would allow us to investigate the strategic interactions
among countries whilst taking these negotiations into account. The introduction of
political economy considerations to the underlying trade model is another area of
interest32, as it might allow us to understand the nature of tariff peaks occurring
after PTAs come into effect. It is our opinion that modifications or extensions of
our framework (as mentioned here) are directions worthy of further research.
As a final remark, it is perhaps important, going forward, to move the debate
of ‘building blocks’ vs. ‘stumbling blocks’ to a level of detail that goes beyond this
binary choice.
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Appendix A. Pseudocode
Note, that a couple of functions and variables are directly baked into the program
without any further explanation in the pseudocode below - for example the matrix
that determines the general network structure (for each player and all coalitions).
The origin and characterization of these can be found in their respective parts in
the main paper. The network structure A and the preference relations B both enter
as a collection of |X| × |X|-matrices, {AS}S⊆N,S 6=∅ and {BS}S⊆N,S 6=∅ resp., where
(AS)i,j = 1{i→Sj}(i, j) and (BS)i,j = 1{i≺Sj}(i, j) for (i, j) ∈ X ×X.
Algorithm Largest Consistent Set
Input: Countries N , Outcomes X, Network Structure A, Preference Relations B
Output: Largest Consistent Set {Y }
1: procedure ParameterSpaceLCS(N,X,A,B)
2: E = eMaxArea . See Section 3.6
3: α = αMinV alue(E) . See Section 3.6
4: for e ∈ E do
5: Y = GeneralLCS(N,X,A,B)
6: return {Y }
7: function GeneralLCS(N,X,A,B)
8: for S ⊆ N do
9: CS = min{AS , BS}
10: D0 = maxS⊆N{CS} . : Direct Dominance
11: n = 0
12: repeat
13: n = n+ 1
14: for S ⊆ N do
15: AnS = (1{(AS ·Dn−1)i,j 6=0}(i, j))(i,j)∈X×X
16: DnS = min{AnS , BS}
17: Dn = maxS⊆N{DnS} . : Indirect Dominance
18: until Dn = Dn−1
19: D = 1X +D
n
20: Y 0 = (1)x∈X
21: m = 0
22: repeat
23: m = m+ 1
24: for x ∈ X do
25: if Y m−1x = 0 then
26: Y mx = 0
27: else
28: y = max
k∈X,S⊆N
{
(AS)x,k
(
1−max
z∈X
{
Y m−1z (D)k,z (1− (BS)x,z)
})}
29: Y mx = Y
m−1
x − y
30: until Y m = Y m−1
31: Y = Y m
32: return Y
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Appendix B. Model
B.1. Individual Welfare. The following table lists the individual welfare for each
(representative) trade agreement, depending on endowments and tariffs, multiplied
with the factor 18. Note that for MFN, CUGFT, FTAGFT, and MTAGFT the
welfare Wi resembles Wj and Wk. In case of CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), and MTA(i,j) the
welfare Wi is similar to Wj . For FTAHub(i) the welfare Wj resembles Wk.
Trade Individual
Agreement Welfare
MFN

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 8t2i + t2j + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek − tj − tk)
+2ej(ek + ti + tk) + 2ek(ti + tj)
CU(i,j)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 11t2ik + t2jk + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek + tjk − tk)
+2ej(ek − 4tik + tk) + 2ek(5tik − tjk)

Wk 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + 4t2ik + 4t2jk − 8t2k + 2ei(ej − 2ek + 2tjk + tk)
+2ej(−2ek + 2tik + tk) + 4ek(9α− 2tik − 2tjk)
CUGFT

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek) + 2ejek
FTA(i,j)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 11t2ik + t2jk + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek + tjk − tk)
+2ej(ek − 4tik + tk) + 2ek(5tik − tjk)

Wk 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + 4t2ik + 4t2jk − 8tk2 + 2ei(ej − 2ek + 2tjk + tk)
+2ej(−2ek + 2tik + tk) + 4ek(9α− 2tik − 2tjk)
FTAHub(i)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + t2jk + t2kj + 4ei(9α− ej − ek + tjk + tkj)
+2ej(ek − tkj)− 2ektjk

Wj 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + 4t2jk − 11t2kj + 2ei(ej − 2ek + 2tjk − 4tkj)
+ej(−4ek + 10tkj) + 4ek(9α− 2tjk)
FTAGFT

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek) + 2ejek
MTA(i,j)

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k − 8t2i + t2j + t2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek − tj − tk)
+2ej(ek + ti + tk) + 2ek(ti + tj)

Wk 2e
2
i + 2e
2
j − 10e2k + t2i + t2j − 8t2k + 2ei(ej − 2ek + tj + tk)
+2ej(−2ek + ti + tk) + 4ek(9α− ti − tj)
MTAGFT

Wi −10e2i + 2e2j + 2e2k + 4ei(9α− ej − ek) + 2ejek
Table 14. The individual welfare for each trade agreement de-
pending on endowments and tariffs
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B.2. Tariffs. The following describes the tariffs that the countries choose for each
trade agreement. In addition to the specific restrictions mentioned in Section 3.3,
all tariffs are bounded both from below and above by zero and the MFN-tariff
respectively. As per WTO rule, the formation of any PTA does not allow additional
tariffs towards others - which results in the upper bound of the MFN-tariff. Also,
any form of subsidies is excluded here - which results in the lower bound of zero.
Now, the following determines and describes the optimal tariffs for each scenario
and the cases where capping occurs:
B.2.1. MFN. In this case, the optimal tariff of country i, given by t∗i =
1
8 (ej + ek),
is always greater than zero as the endowments themselves are greater than zero.
Additionally, t∗i is going to play the role of the maximal tariff for country i for all
the other agreements, then denoted tMFNi .
B.2.2. CU. Consider the scenario CU(i,j), then the optimal tariff of country i to-
wards country k, given by t∗ik =
1
5 (2ek − ej), is always greater than zero but not
always less than the MFN-tariff (and the one towards country j, t∗ij , is always zero):
i) Lower Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≥ 35ej and thus ek > 12ej ,
which guarantees t∗ik > 0.
ii) Upper Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≤ 53ej however t∗ik ≤ tMFNi
requires ek ≤ 1311ej , which leaves the interval 1311ej < ek ≤ 53ej to require capping.
For this interval, the (maximal) MFN-tariff is optimal as the derivative of the joint
welfare with respect to tik is always greater than zero on the interval [0, tMFNi ]:
∂(Wi +Wj)
tik
=
1
9
(−10tik − 2ej + 4ek) ≥ 1
36
(−13ej + 11ek) > 0
B.2.3. FTA. Consider the scenario FTA(i,j), then the optimal tariff of country i
towards country k, given by t∗ik =
1
11 (5ek−4ej), is neither always greater than zero
nor always less than the MFN-tariff (but the one towards country j, t∗ij , is zero):
i) Lower Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≥ 35ej however t∗ik ≥ 0
requires ek ≥ 45ej , which leaves the interval 35ej ≤ ek < 45ej to require capping.
For this interval, the (minmal) zero-tariff is optimal as the derivative of the welfare
with respect to tik is always lesser than zero on the interval [0, tMFNi ]:
∂Wi
∂tik
=
1
9
(−11tik − 4ej + 5ek) ≤ 1
9
(5ek − 4ej) < 0
ii) Upper Bound. By assumption on the endowments ek ≤ 53ej however t∗ik ≤ tMFNi
requires ek ≤ 4329ej , which leaves the interval 4329ej < ek ≤ 53ej to require capping.
For this interval, the (maximal) MFN-tariff is optimal as the derivative of the
welfare with respect to tik is always greater than zero on the interval [0, tMFNi ]:
∂Wi
∂tik
=
1
9
(−11tik − 4ej + 5ek) ≥ 1
72
(−43ej + 29ek) > 0
B.2.4. MTA. Consider the scenario MTA(i,j), then the optimal tariff of country i,
given by t∗i =
1
7 (2ek − ej), is greater than zero and less or equal to the MFN-tariff
as per assumption on the endowments 35ej ≤ ek ≤ 53ej .
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B.2.5. Notes. The analysis considered country i and an agreement with country j,
but it naturally extends to all other combinations. Also, the perspective of the third
country needs no further analysis as it always chooses the MFN-tariff. Furthermore,
the case of FTAHub(i) is simply a combination of FTA(i,j) and FTA(i,k). Finally,
the three variants of GFT require no additional analysis as every country always
chooses the zero-tariff. Information on another form of GFT, Pseudo-GFT, that
technically exists but turns out to be negligible, can be found in Appendix B.5.1.
B.3. Overall Welfare. The following table lists the overall welfare for each (rep-
resentative) trade agreement, depending purely on endowments, computed modulo
2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
, which is the common term associated with the factor α. Also, the
notation lc and lc is used to indicate that country l is capped in terms of tariffs from
below or above respectively. Note that one specific comparison of trade agreements
is presented in more detail in Appendix B.5.2.
Trade Overall
Agreement Welfare
MFN

no cap 11
32
(−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
CU(i,j)

no cap 1
1600
(−563e2i − 550eiej − 448eiek − 563e2j − 448ejek − 704e2k)

ic 1
1600
(−563e2i − 550eiej − 448eiek − 550e2j − 550ejek − 627e2k)

ic, jc 11
32
(−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
CUGFT

no cap 1
3
(−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
FTA(i,j)

no cap 1
7744
(−2963e2i − 2662eiej − 1728eiek − 2963e2j − 1728ejek − 3648e2k)

ic
1
23232
(−8889e2i − 7986eiej − 5184eiek − 7865e2j − 7744ejek − 9344e2k)

ic, ic
1
192
(−65e2i − 66eiej − 64eiek − 65e2j − 64ejek − 64e2k)

ic 1
7744
(−2963e2i − 2662eiej − 1728eiek − 2662e2j − 2662ejek − 3155e2k)

ic, jc 11
32
(−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
FTAHub(i)

no cap 1
363
(−153e2i − 81eiej − 81eiek − 146e2j − 121ejek − 146e2k)

jc
1
363
(−137e2i − 81eiej − 121eiek − 146e2j − 121ejek − 121e2k)

jc, kc
1
3
(−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)

jc 1
23232
(−8889e2i − 5184eiej − 7986eiek − 9344e2j − 7744ejek − 7865e2k)

jc, kc 1
192
(−66e2i − 66eiej − 66eiek − 65e2j − 64ejek − 65e2k)
FTAGFT

no cap 1
3
(−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
MTA(i,j)

no cap 1
3136
(−1083e2i − 1078eiej − 960eiek − 1083e2j − 960ejek − 1216e2k)
MTAGFT

no cap 1
3
(−e2i − eiej − eiek − e2j − ejek − e2k)
Table 15. The overall welfare for each trade agreement depending
on endowments
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B.4. Transition Tables. The following lists the network structure of Section 3.5,
specifically Figure 1 and 2, in the form of transition tables:
x1 ∈ X x2 ∈ X \ {x1} with x1 →{i} x2
MFN -
CU(i,j) MFN
CU(j,k) -
CU(k,i) MFN
CUGFT CU(j,k)
FTA(i,j) MFN
FTA(j,k) -
FTA(k,i) MFN
FTAHub(i) MFN, FTA(i,j), FTA(k,i)
FTAHub(j) FTA(j,k)
FTAHub(k) FTA(j,k)
FTAGFT FTA(j,k), FTAHub(j), FTAHub(k)
MTA(i,j) MFN
MTA(j,k) -
MTA(k,i) MFN
MTAGFT MTA(j,k)
(a) The transition table for coalition {i}, i ∈ N .
x1 ∈ X x2 ∈ X \ {x1} with x1 →{i,j} x2
MFN CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CU(i,j) MFN, FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CU(j,k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CU(k,i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
CUGFT MFN, CU(i,j), CU(j,k), CU(k,i), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
FTA(i,j) MFN, CU(i,j), MTA(i,j)
FTA(j,k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTAHub(j), MTA(i,j)
FTA(k,i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTAHub(i), MTA(i,j)
FTAHub(i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(k,i), MTA(i,j)
FTAHub(j) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(j,k), MTA(i,j)
FTAHub(k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(j,k), FTA(k,i),
FTAGFT, MTA(i,j)
FTAGFT MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), FTA(j,k), FTA(k,i),
FTAHub(i), FTAHub(j), FTAHub(k), MTA(i,j)
MTA(i,j) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j)
MTA(j,k) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
MTA(k,i) MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j)
MTAGFT MFN, CU(i,j), FTA(i,j), MTA(i,j), MTA(j,k), MTA(k,i)
(b) The transition table for coalition {i, j}, i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
Table 16. The network structure as transition tables
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B.5. Additional Remarks.
B.5.1. Pseudo-GFT. In Appendix B.2 a special case of ‘Pseudo-GFT’ is a possibil-
ity. Namely, in the case of a hub structure with both non-hub nodes capping at zero
the trade agreement amounts to the same tariff structure (and welfare) of a GFT.
If it were ever part of the stable set, then it would necessarily need to be considered
de facto GFT even though it is not de jure GFT. However, in our analysis this case
never occured and it is therefore a negligible oddity.
B.5.2. A Special Case. As can be seen in Table 15 the overall welfare is equal in
case of MFN, CU(ic, jc), and FTA(ic, jc) even though the tariff structure is differ-
ent. The following explores this equivalence in order to provide an insight into the
underlying mechanics. In terms of tariff structure both CU(ic, jc) and FTA(ic, jc)
are the same and therefore it is sufficient to compare MFN with CU(ic, jc) when
only interested in (effects on) welfare. Now, Table 17 shows us the differences in the
welfare (components) both on the individual as well as on the joint/overall level,
which are computed from the expressions in Table 18 and 19.
∆(MFN,CU(ic, jc))
TRi 1/24(ej + ek)(2ej − ek)
CSi (32e
2
i + 64eiek − 13e2j − 26ejek + 19e2k)/1152
PSi 1/12ei(−ei − ek)
Wi (−64e2i − 32eiek + 83e2j + 22ejek − 29e2k)/1152
TRj 1/24(ei + ek)(2ei − ek)
CSj (−13e2i − 26eiek + 32e2j + 64ejek + 19e2k)/1152
PSj 1/12ej(−ej − ek)
Wj (83e
2
i + 22eiek − 64e2j − 32ejek − 29e2k)/1152
TRk 0
CSk 19(−e2i − 2eiek − e2j − 2ejek − 2e2k)/1152
PSk 1/24ek(ei + ej + 2ek)
Wk (−19e2i + 10eiek − 19e2j + 10ejek + 58e2k)/1152
(a) The difference in the individual welfare (components) depending on endowments
∆(MFN,CU(ic, jc))
TRi + TRj 1/24(2e
2
i + eiek + 2e
2
j + ejek − 2e2k)
CSi + CSj 19(e
2
i + 2eiek + e
2
j + 2ejek + 2e
2
k)/1152
PSi + PSj 1/12(−e2i − eiek − e2j − ejek)
Wi +Wj (19e
2
i − 10eiek + 19e2j − 10ejek − 58e2k)/1152∑
n∈N TRn 1/24(2e
2
i + eiek + 2e
2
j + ejek − 2e2k)∑
n∈N CSn 0∑
n∈N PSn 1/24(−2e2i − eiek − 2e2j − ejek + 2e2k)∑
n∈N Wn 0
(b) The difference in the joint/overall welfare (components) depending on endowments
Table 17. The difference in the welfare (components) depending
on endowments
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Welfare Components
MFN
TRi (ej + ek)
2/32
CSi (18e
2
i + 13e
2
j + 13e
2
k + 8ejek + 18ei(ej + ek))/128
PSi −ei(−16α+ 6ei + 3ej + 3ek)/8
TRj (ei + ek)
2/32
CSj (13e
2
i + 18e
2
j + 13e
2
k + 8eiek + 18ej(ei + ek))/128
PSj −ej(−16α+ 3ei + 6ej + 3ek)/8
TRk (ei + ej)
2/32
CSk (13e
2
i + 13e
2
j + 18e
2
k + 8eiej + 18ek(ei + ej))/128
PSk −ek(−16α+ 3ei + 3ej + 6ek)/8
CU(ic, jc)
TRi −(5ej − 7ek)(ej + ek)/96
CSi (65e
2
i + 65e
2
j + 49e
2
k + 49ejek + ei(81ej + 49ek))/576
PSi −ei(−48α+ 16ei + 9ej + 7ek)/24
TRj −(5ei − 7ek)(ei + ek)/96
CSj (65e
2
i + 65e
2
j + 49e
2
k + 49eiek + ej(81ei + 49ek))/576
PSj −ej(−48α+ 9ei + 16ej + 7ek)/24
TRk (ei + ej)
2/32
CSk (17e
2
i + 17e
2
j + 25e
2
k + 25eiek + 25ejek + 9eiej)/144
PSk −ek(−24α+ 5ei + 5ej + 10ek)/12
(a) The individual welfare (components) depending on endowments
Welfare Components
MFN
TRi + TRj 1/32(e
2
i + 2eiek + e
2
j + 2ejek + 2e
2
k)
CSi + CSj 1/128(31e
2
i + 36eiej + 26eiek + 31e
2
j + 26ejek + 26e
2
k)
PSi + PSj 1/8(−6e2i − 6eiej − 3eiek − 6e2j − 3ejek) + 2α(ei + ej)∑
n∈N TRn 1/16(e
2
i + eiej + eiek + e
2
j + ejek + e
2
k)∑
n∈N CSn 11/32(e
2
i + eiej + eiek + e
2
j + ejek + e
2
k)∑
n∈N PSn 1/4(−3e2i − 3eiej − 3eiek − 3e2j − 3ejek − 3e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
CU(ic, jc)
TRi + TRj 1/96(−5e2i + 2eiek − 5e2j + 2ejek + 14e2k)
CSi + CSj 1/288(65e
2
i + 81eiej + 49eiek + 65e
2
j + 49ejek + 49e
2
k)
PSi + PSj 1/24(−16e2i − 18eiej − 7eiek − 16e2j − 7ejek) + 2α(ei + ej)∑
n∈N TRn 1/48(−e2i + 3eiej + eiek − e2j + ejek + 7e2k)∑
n∈N CSn 11/32(e
2
i + eiej + eiek + e
2
j + ejek + e
2
k)∑
n∈N PSn 1/24(−16e2i − 18eiej − 17eiek − 16e2j − 17ejek − 20e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
(b) The joint/overall welfare (components) depending on endowments
Table 18. The welfare (components) depending on endowments
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Trade Individual/Joint/Overall
Agreement Welfare
MFN

Wi 1/128(−78e2i + 256αei − 30eiej − 30eiek + 17e2j + 16ejek + 17e2k)

Wj 1/128(17e
2
i − 30eiej + 16eiek − 78e2j + 256αej − 30ejek + 17e2k)

Wk 1/128(17e
2
i + 16eiej − 30eiek + 17e2j − 30ejek − 78e2k + 256αek)

Wi +Wj 1/128(−61e2i − 60eiej − 14eiek − 61e2j − 14ejek + 34e2k) + 2α(ei + ej)

∑
n∈N Wn 1/32(−11e2i − 11eiej − 11eiek − 11e2j − 11ejek − 11e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
CU(ic, jc)

Wi 1/576(−319e2i + 1152αei − 135eiej − 119eiek + 35e2j + 61ejek + 91e2k)

Wj 1/576(35e
2
i − 135eiej + 61eiek − 319e2j + 1152αej − 119ejek + 91e2k)

Wk 1/288(43e
2
i + 36eiej − 70eiek + 43e2j − 70ejek − 190e2k + 576αek)

Wi +Wj 1/288(−142e2i − 135eiej − 29eiek − 142e2j − 29ejek + 91e2k) + 2α(ei + ej)

∑
n∈N Wn 1/32(−11e2i − 11eiej − 11eiek − 11e2j − 11ejek − 11e2k) + 2α
(∑
n∈N en
)
Table 19. The welfare depending on endowments
Now, recall that capping at the MFN-tariff for both members of a customs union,
in this case CU(ic, jc), occurs when the endowment of the non-member is above a
minimal value determined by the endowments of the members, max{ei, ej} < 1113ek
(Appendix B.2). Using this together with the general assumptions on the relation
of endowments, the following effects on welfare (components) take place, where
each expression of the type ‘+c’ for some c is positive and each ‘−c’ negative:
∆(MFN,CU(ic, jc))
Country i Country j Country k
TR
+τi +τj 0
+τij 0
+τ
CS
+γi +γj −γk
+γij −γk
0
PS
−ρi −ρj +ρk
−ρij +ρk
−ρ
W
±ωi ±ωj +ωk
−ωij +ωk
0
Table 20. The effect on the welfare (components)
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Appendix C. Analysis
C.1. Additional Graphics. The following provides detailed figures:
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F
T
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T
A
H
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F
T
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G
F
T
M
T
A
M
T
A
G
F
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1 x x x
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3 x x x x x x x
4 x x x x x x x x
5 x
6 x x
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8 x x x x x
9 x x x x x x
10 x x
11 x x x
12 x x x x
13 x x x x x x
14 x x x x x
(a) Overall Stability with PTAs
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3 x
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(b) Overall Stability without PTAs
Figure 21. Overall Stability with and without PTAs
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(a) with PTAs (b) without PTAs
Figure 22. Stability of MFN
(a) with PTAs (b) without PTAs
Figure 23. Stability of MTA
(a) with PTAs (b) without PTAs
Figure 24. Stability of MTAGFT
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(a) CU (b) CUGFT
Figure 25. Stability of CU
(a) FTA (b) FTAGFT
(c) FTAHub
Figure 26. Stability of FTA
C.2. Exact Intervals. The table here lists the exact intervals where each specific
trade agreement is part of the stable set (for the border of the parameter space):
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Trade Exact
Agreement Interval(s)
eb = emin ≤ ec ≤ emax = ea
CU(b,c) [1.0000000000000000,1.3380093520374081]
CU(c,a) [1.3259853039412157,1.6666666666666667]
FTA(b,c) [1.0000000000000000,1.3807615230460921]
FTA(c,a) [1.3353373413493654,1.6305945223780896]
FTAHub(c) [1.2364729458917836,1.2698730794923179]
[1.3353373413493654,1.3647294589178356]
MTA(c,a) [1.379425517702071,1.635938543754175]
eb = ec = emin ≤ ea ≤ emax
CU(a,b) [1.0240480961923848,1.1108884435537743]
CU(b,c) [1.0240480961923848,1.6666666666666667]
CU(c,a) [1.0240480961923848,1.1108884435537743]
CUGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.1803607214428857]
FTA(a,b) [1.0240480961923848,1.2404809619238477]
FTA(b,c) [1.0240480961923848,1.29124916499666]
[1.483633934535738,1.6666666666666667]
FTA(c,a) [1.0240480961923848,1.2404809619238477]
FTAHub(b) [1.0013360053440215,1.29124916499666]
FTAHub(c) [1.0013360053440215,1.29124916499666]
FTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.1803607214428857]
MTA(a,b) [1.0240480961923848,1.1469605878423514]
MTA(c,a) [1.0240480961923848,1.1469605878423514]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.1803607214428857]
eb = emin ≤ ea = ec ≤ emax
MFN [1.2044088176352705,1.2297929191716768]
[1.2752171008684035,1.276553106212425]
CU(a,b) [1.0454241816967267,1.2498329993319974]
CU(b,c) [1.0454241816967267,1.2498329993319974]
CU(c,a) [1.0494321977287908,1.6666666666666667]
CUGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.2297929191716768]
FTA(a,b) [1.0494321977287908,1.2925851703406814]
FTA(b,c) [1.0494321977287908,1.2925851703406814]
FTA(c,a) [1.0454241816967267,1.2925851703406814]
FTAHub(a) [1.0454241816967267,1.276553106212425]
FTAHub(b) [1.0454241816967267,1.2925851703406814]
FTAHub(c) [1.0454241816967267,1.276553106212425]
FTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.2297929191716768]
MTA(a,b) [1.0494321977287908,1.2244488977955912]
MTA(b,c) [1.0494321977287908,1.2244488977955912]
MTA(c,a) [1.0454241816967267,1.2925851703406814]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.2297929191716768]
Table 27. The exact intervals of stability with PTAs
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Trade Exact
Agreement Interval(s)
eb = emin ≤ ec ≤ emax = ea
MFN [1.0000000000000000,1.3780895123580494]
MTA(b,c) [1.0000000000000000,1.0000000000000000]
MTA(c,a) [1.379425517702071,1.6666666666666667]
eb = ec = emin ≤ ea ≤ emax
MFN [1.6666666666666667,1.6666666666666667]
MTA(a,b) [1.0307281229124916,1.1469605878423514]
MTA(b,c) [1.0307281229124916,1.1469605878423514]
[1.3754175016700068,1.6666666666666667]
MTA(c,a) [1.0307281229124916,1.1469605878423514]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.3740814963259853]
eb = emin ≤ ea = ec ≤ emax
MTA(a,b) [1.0160320641282565,1.1202404809619237]
MTA(b,c) [1.0160320641282565,1.1202404809619237]
MTA(c,a) [1.0160320641282565,1.6666666666666667]
MTAGFT [1.0000000000000000,1.203072812291249]
Table 28. The exact intervals of stability without PTAs
